Does the United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change Pass the Cost-Benefit Analysis Test? by Arlota, Carolina
 
881 
DOES THE UNITED STATES’ WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 
PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE PASS THE 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TEST? 
CAROLINA ARLOTA* 
ABSTRACT 
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the 
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change.  The United States, the biggest producer of carbon 
dioxide in history, was actively involved in the negotiation and 
approval of the Agreement.  Most considered the Paris Agreement 
an overall success, and it was cited as the only effective institutional 
solution to climate change.  According to its legal framework, the 
U.S.’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) required the 
country only to continue its trend on reducing carbon emissions.  As 
such, the United States’ withdrawal was a contentious topic even 
between members of the Trump administration.  CEOs of major U.S. 
companies and members of both political parties criticized the 
decision, so did world leaders.  In light of this controversy, this 
Article assesses the domestic and international costs and benefits of 
the withdrawal to the United States.  The baseline for comparison is 
the period during which the United States was party to the 
Agreement, including the benefits accrued.  Accordingly, this 
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Article focuses on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal itself—
not on the existence of the Agreement. 
From a theoretical perspective, this Article fills a void in the 
international environmental law literature, because to date no 
studies on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal have been 
published.  In addition, it contributes to the environmental law 
literature because it addresses a contemporary example of a public 
policy enacted without the normative use of economics, one that 
disregarded cost-benefit analysis as a methodological tool for 
maximizing U.S. overall well-being.  This research is particularly 
relevant due to the significant increase of U.S. carbon dioxide 
emissions in 2018, and the limited improvement in global energy 
efficiency that year.  This Article also advances a trending topic on 
climate change studies, because it is the first to research the current 
U.S. litigation on the Paris Agreement specifically.  Moreover, it 
provides unique arguments to be used in future litigation and policy 
assessments. 
This Article is organized as follows:  Part I provides an overview 
of the Paris Agreement and the U.S. withdrawal, establishing 
foundational concepts to be addressed.  Part II presents a cost-
benefit analysis of such withdrawal, focusing on the manner in 
which it was decided, and finds evidence that it was not reasoned.  
The Article argues that this unreasoned approach increases legal 
uncertainty, contributing to an increase in litigation.  Part III 
addresses the costs and benefits of the withdrawal based on its 
substantive terms, i.e., its merits.  It assesses the quantitative and 
qualitative effects of the withdrawal for the United States, and 
related challenges.  Likewise, it considers the international impact of 
such a withdrawal for the country.  Part IV concludes that the U.S. 
withdrawal does not pass the comprehensive cost-benefit test 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the 
country would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change.1  The United States, the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 
history,2 was actively involved in the negotiation and approval of 
this Agreement.3   Most consider the Paris Agreement an overall 
success, 4  and it is often cited as “perhaps, the only, effective 
institutional response to climate change.”5  According to its legal 
 
 1 Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., Statement by President Trump on 
the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DJ2-39JD].  For an overview on the Paris Agreement, see Izzet 
Ari & Ramazan Sari, Differentiation of Developed and Developing Countries for the Paris 
Agreement, 18 ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 175, 181 (2017) (emphasizing the need to 
develop an international agreement meant to combat climate change that accounts 
for the differences in carbon emissions between developed and developing 
countries). 
 2 For historical data since 1850, see Justin Gillis & Nadja Popovich, The U.S. is 
the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History.  It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-
polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html 
[https://perma.cc/EH32-CGV9].  For data on current emissions and per capita 
contributions to the Paris Agreement, see Table 2 in Appendix I. 
 3 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement by the President on the Paris 
Climate Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/12/12/us-leadership-and-historic-paris-agreement-combat-
climate-change [https://perma.cc/C5TA-LK98]. President Obama committed the 
United States to a 26% to 28% reduction of the 2005 levels of GHG emissions by 
2025.  See Fact Sheet: U.S. Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC, OFF. OF 
THE PRESS SEC’Y (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc 
[https://perma.cc/4AZW-3AG3]. 
 4 See Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: The Mitigation Potential of 
Private Climate Governance After the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 327 
(2018) (explaining how the Paris Agreement has “energized unprecedented 
commitments by a wide range of non-State actors, including all levels of 
government . . . as well as private citizens, companies, and civil society.”).  
Environmentalists, however, consider the U.S. target modest.  See, e.g., Luke Kemp, 
Better out than in, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 458, 458 (2017) (describing the U.S.’s 
target under the Paris Agreement as “inadequate”).  
 5 Mark Cooper, Governing the Global Climate Commons: The Political Economy of 
State and Local Action, After the U.S. Flip-Flop on the Paris Agreement, 118 ENERGY 
POL’Y 440, 441 (2018). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
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framework, the U.S. nationally determined contribution (“NDC”)6 
requires only that the country continue its trend of reducing carbon 
emissions.7  As such, the U.S. withdrawal, which will likely take 
effect in late 2020,8 was a contentious topic even within the Trump 
administration.9  CEOs of major U.S. companies10 and members of 
both political parties criticized the decision, 11  as did European 
 
 6 ”Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally 
determined contributions that it intends to achieve.  Parties shall pursue domestic 
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions.”  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of 
Parties, Twenty-First Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 4(2), U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].  
Nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”) are voluntary targets determined 
by each country.  Id. 
 7 See Dana Nuccitelli, Fact Check: China Pledged Bigger Climate Action than the 
USA; Republican Leaders Wrong, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-
cent/2014/nov/14/fact-check-china-pledged-bigger-climate-action-republican-
leaders-wrong [https://perma.cc/E9BX-LEPN] (discussing President Barack 
Obama’s pledge to reduce carbon pollution in 2014—prior to the signing of the 
Paris Agreement). 
 8 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28 (outlining the withdrawal mechanism).  
The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016.  Paris Agreement-
Status of the Ratification, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2020), https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-
ratification [https://perma.cc/RV8R-T8U2].  According to Article 28, the first date 
for parties to validly withdraw was November 4, 2019.  This was the exact date the 
U.S. confirmed its intent to withdraw.  See Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to 
Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-
climate.html [https://perma.cc/P75U-NKKT]. 
 9  Energy Secretary Rick Perry, former National Security Advisor H. R. 
McMaster, former economic advisor Gary Cohn, and now-departed Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson were against the withdrawal.  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2019). 
 10 See Richard Luscombe, Top U.S. Firms Including Walmart and Ford Oppose 
Trump on Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/01/trump-climate-
change-paris-withdrawal-ford-walmart [https://perma.cc/U48E-VN7S] (noting 
the commitment of Walmart, General Motors, Ford, and Mars to sustainability and 
their disappointment regarding the U.S.’s decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement). 
 11 See Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris 
Climate Deal, Sparking Criticism at Home and Abroad, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-announce-us-will-exit-
paris-climate-deal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da-11e7-bcde-
624ad94170ab_story.html [https://perma.cc/L7X8-8AKT] (discussing the “deep 
divide within the Trump administration over” the withdraw from the Paris Climate 
Agreement).  
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leaders. 12   In light of this controversy, the Article assesses the 
domestic and international costs and benefits of withdrawal for the 
United States. 13   The baseline for comparison is the period the 
United States was party to the Agreement, including benefits 
accrued. 14   Accordingly, this Article focuses on the cost-benefit 
analysis of the withdrawal itself—not on the mere existence of the 
Paris Agreement.  The comprehensive cost-benefit analysis 
developed within the Article demonstrates the U.S. withdrawal is 
not justified.15 
Scientific consensus correlates climate change with global 
warming, of which one human-induced cause is the accumulation 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.16  A primary goal of 
 
 12  In a joint statement, French President Emmanuel Macron, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, and then-Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni 
rebuked President Trump’s intention to renegotiate the Paris Agreement, stating: 
“We deem the momentum generated in Paris in December 2015 irreversible and we 
firmly believe that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated, since it is a vital 
instrument for our planet, societies and economies.”  Paris Agreement Cannot be 
Renegotiated, PERMANENT MISSION OF FR. TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN N.Y. (June 1, 
2017), https://onu.delegfrance.org/Paris-Agreement-cannot-be-renegotiated 
[https://perma.cc/VW9B-7R26].  Moreover, the other 190 state parties to the Paris 
Agreement have no incentive to renegotiate the treaty with a “flailing American 
administration.”  KOH, supra note 9, at 42. 
 13 Cost-benefit analysis is used as a technique to systematically assess the 
“efficiency impacts” of policies.  DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY 
ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 398 (Routledge 6th ed. 2017). 
 14 The Agreement entered into force on Nov. 4, 2016.  Paris Agreement, supra 
note 6, art. 21(1). 
 15 The costs are significant.  A recent study on heat-related mortality avoided 
from lowering current emissions in line with the Paris Agreement found that, with 
a high degree of confidence and using conservative estimations, the United States 
would avoid between 70 to 1980 annual heat-related deaths.  Y. T. Eunice Lo et al., 
Increasing Mitigation Ambition to Meet the Paris Agreement’s Temperature Goal Avoids 
Substantial Heat-Related Mortality in U.S. Cities, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 6-8 (2019).  
According to the EPA, natural disasters in 2017 (e.g., wildfires, floods, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms) caused $306.2 billion in cumulative damages, 
making the year the most expensive on record.  The report also emphasizes that 
climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of such events.  
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PLANNING FOR NATURAL DISASTER DEBRIS 
1 (Apr. 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
05/documents/final_pndd_guidance_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LY9-9X95]. 
 16 The majority of the scientific community acknowledges the existence of 
climate change, and that GHG emissions are a primary cause.  See Richard S. J. Tol, 
Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Literature: A Re-
Analysis, 73 ENERGY POL’Y 701 (2014) (discussing the position of various members 
of the scientific community).  See also Richard S. J. Tol, The Elusive Consensus on 
Climate Change 8 (Univ. Sussex Bus. Sch., Working Paper Series No. 0319, 2019) 
(noting that 97% of scientific studies point to human activity as the most important 
factor in climate change since 1950). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
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the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is the stabilization of GHG emissions.17  One aim of the 
Paris Agreement is to limit the global increase in mean temperature 
well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.18   Because the 
Agreement targets the reduction of GHGs,19 it was a contentious 
topic in the United States even before the country announced its 
intent to withdraw.20  Despite the scientific consensus,21 preeminent 
U.S. politicians remain skeptical about the existence of climate 
 
 17  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (May 9, 1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC].  The UNFCCC 
entered into force on March 21, 1994.  Id. art. 23.  The scientific consensus regarding 
the existence of climate change and the necessity of mitigation were paramount 
considerations during UNFCCC negotiations.  John Houghton, Science and 
International Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 353, 355-57 
(Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2001).  
 18  ”This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, 
including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of 
climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate 
poverty, including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this 
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”  Paris 
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2. 
 19  The Paris Agreement, with its goal of reducing GHGs, was negotiated 
following the legal framework of the UNFCCC “a treaty with 196 state parties to 
which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992.”  See KOH, supra note 9, at 39. 
 20 Traditionally, coal producers and electric power companies have resisted 
GHG regulation.  For instance, American Electric Power (AEP), then the nation’s 
largest electricity generator and consumer of coal, testified in Congress against 
regulations.  Elisabeth Smick, U.S. Companies and Greenhouse Gas Regulations, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 2 (Sept. 14, 2006), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-companies-and-greenhouse-gas-
regulations [https://perma.cc/7SX8-XHHA]. 
 21 The EPA acknowledges that the combustion of fossil fuels is the “main 
human activity” that emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.  See Overview of 
Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#carbon-
dioxide [https://perma.cc/GVJ8-S4XG].  But see Craig D. Idso et al., Climate Science, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED II: FOSSIL FUELS 107, 109 (Joseph L. Bast & Diane 
Carol Bast eds., 2019) (highlighting the reasons for disagreements among scientists 
about the causes of climate change, including bias and lack of causation). 
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change.22  The U.S. Congress, however, recognizes climate change as 
a direct threat to national security.23 
In light of this skepticism, a methodological note is required.  
This research is based on the general law and economics 
assumption—and a tenet of cost-benefit analysis—that regulation 
should aim to increase overall well-being rather than economic 
efficiency.24  In the climate change arena, the former is more suitable.  
“Unregulated competitive markets can generate seriously excessive 
amounts of residuals, including pollution, hazardous waste, and 
other forms of environmental degradation.”25  These market failures 
justify strong regulatory measures.26  Moreover, climate change is 
 
 22 President Trump claimed that global warming was “created by” China to 
undermine the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing.  Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385 
[https://perma.cc/7G5Q-5HWK].  His understanding contradicts the most recent 
scientific report issued by a panel of experts from thirteen U.S. administrative 
agencies.  See Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, U.S. 
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 35-72 (2018), 
https://www.globalchange.gov/nca4 [https://perma.cc/VC8G-XSEG] (“[The 
report] concludes that the evidence of human-caused climate change is 
overwhelming and continues to strengthen, that the impacts of climate change are 
intensifying across the country, and that climate-related threats to Americans’ 
physical, social, and economic well-being are rising.“).  
 23 See National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-91, § 335, 131 Stat. 1283, 1358 (2017) (outlining the national security concerns 
associated with the future effects of climate change).  Congress is also concerned 
with the impact of climate change at localities where U.S. Armed Forces operate, 
and where strategic implications for future conflict exist.  Id. (“[C]limate change is 
a direct threat to the national security of the United States and is impacting stability 
in areas of the world both where the United States Armed Forced are operating 
today, and where strategic implications for future conflict exist”).  Id.  
 24  See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25 (2006) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is an imperfect but practicable 
tool by which governmental decision-makers implement the criterion of overall 
welfare—a criterion that differs from the Kaldor Hicks efficiency in important 
ways.”).  The current consensus is that efficiency is difficult to define.  Therefore, 
the modern foundation of cost-benefit analysis rests upon the maximization of 
overall well-being, which is one of several criteria mentioned in law and economics 
literature.  For a discussion about Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and 
cost-benefit-analysis, see id. at 21-23.  
 25  Richard Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: 
Opportunities and Obstacles, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 171, 172 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2001).  
 26 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
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the “quintessential global-scale collective action problem,” 27 
because it affects those who do not contribute to it, while the benefits 
of carbon abatement are not restricted to those who pursue it.28  
Hence, the involved parties have incentives to free ride.29 
Beyond its global scale, climate change is unique because it 
refers primarily to future events,30 with “implications that require 
policy coordination and multi-level governance” (national and 
international levels, specifically).31  Two factors contribute to this 
complexity.  First, human behavior discounts the value of long-term 
challenges in favor of present gains. 32   Second, the majority of 
countries in the developed world are democracies based on electoral 
cycles that tend to reward short-term considerations.33  Therefore, it 
is crucial to enact climate change regulation under international 
treaties.34 
The Paris Agreement, which is aligned with the modern 
framework on climate governance, reconciles elements of bottom-
 
 27 Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L. I. Moffa, Why Climate Change Collective Action 
Has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime, 15 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 777, 777 (2012).  Pollution is the paradigmatic example of the tragedy of 
the commons, for which coercive laws and taxation are cited as potential solutions.  
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245-47 (1968) 
(incentivizing individuals to reduce pollution requires “coercive laws or taxing 
devices that make it cheaper for the polluter” to not to pollute than pollute).  
Summarizing the tragedy of the commons, he states: “The rational man finds that 
his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the 
cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them.  Since this is true for everyone, 
we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as 
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.”  Id. at 1245. 
 28 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF POLICY TRANSITIONS 120 (2014) (“Because the benefits of carbon abatement cannot 
be restricted to those who contributed to creating them, all parties have an incentive 
to freeride.”). 
 29 Id. 
 30 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2ed. 2011). 
 31 Esty & Moffa, supra note 27, at 777. 
 32 See GIDDENS, supra note 30, at 2-3 (explaining future discounting, or the idea 
that humans prefer a small reward in the present instead of a large reward in the 
future).  See also Peter C. Fishburn & Ariel Rubinstein, Time Preference, 23 INT’L ECON. 
REV. 677, 677 (1982) (discussing how decisions are affected by time on the “relative 
desirability of an outcome”). 
 33  See GIDDENS, supra note 30, at 7 (“In democratic countries, governments 
come and go. Moreover, in real-life contexts many issues jostle for attention . . .”). 
 34 See Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Problems Under 
Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 15, 18 
(2017) (arguing that combatting climate change requires widespread collaboration). 
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top measures, such as NDCs, 35  with the joint efforts of member 
states to reduce carbon emissions (top-down mechanisms). 36  
According to this Agreement, all countries are obligated to establish 
a target and to report and evaluate their progress within two years 
after signing, and every five years after. 37   While this Article 
acknowledges the controversy concerning the legal status of the 
Paris Agreement under U.S. law,38 it dismisses it because both the 
Obama and Trump administrations considered it an agreement.39  
Under international law, however, the Paris Agreement is a treaty,40 
 
 35  See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3-4, 6 (codifying the voluntary 
commitments that parties to the Agreement are making to reduce GHG emissions). 
 36 These bottom-top measures require countries to establish NDCs with more 
demanding targets than those set in the past.  Each country voluntarily determines 
its targets, considering their own national priorities, circumstances, and 
capabilities.  Jennifer Morgan et al., Elements and Ideas for the 2015 Paris Agreement 12 
(World Resources Inst., Working Paper, 2015). 
 37 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(2), 4(3), 4(9), 4(11). 
 38 U.S. domestic law on treaties is complex, because the terminology used in 
international law and U.S. domestic law differs.  Under international law, all 
written international agreements governed by international law are referred to as 
“treaties,” whereas in U.S. law, only some are labeled as such.  According to U.S. 
law, the President has the power to sign a treaty, but it does not go into effect until 
it is ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.  U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.  Executive 
agreements are international agreements concluded by the President under 
independent constitutional authority in his capacity as commander-in-chief, but 
these agreements are treaties for international law purposes.  See BARRY E. CARTER 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (7th ed. 2018).   
 39 For more information, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris 
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016) (examining the 
ambiguity surrounding whether the Paris Agreement is a legally binding 
agreement).  The Department of State determined the Paris Agreement did not 
address substantive legal obligations beyond those stated in its parent treaty, the 
UNFCCC (supra note 17), and concluded there was no need to submit it to the 
Senate.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 711 FAM 723 (2001) 
(requiring that international agreements receive consent from two-thirds of the 
Senate).  
 40 Under international law, the Paris Agreement is unequivocally a treaty.  See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
332.  The United States signed the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016, and the treaty 
entered into force on November 4, 2016.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 21.  
See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 39, at 142.  But cf. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 3 (2016) 
(detailing the efforts of the Obama administration in negotiating the Paris 
Agreement as an executive agreement).  For purposes of the cost-benefit analysis 
developed in this Article, the controversy is not determinative because the United 
States is legally bound to its provisions under international law, regardless of 
domestic determinations.  The Paris Agreement also determines a three-year 
minimum period after its entry into force for parties to withdraw.  See Paris 
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and the United States is legally bound until the withdrawal becomes 
effective.41   Importantly, cost-benefit analysis theorists have long 
defended respect for international law.42 
From a theoretical perspective, this Article fills a void in the 
international environmental law literature, because, to-date, few to 
no studies on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal have been 
published. 43   The framework chosen for this research also 
contributes to the literature on cost-benefit analysis,44  because it 
addresses a contemporary example of a public policy enacted 
without the normative use of economics.45  This Article builds on the 
use of cost-benefit analysis to improve the environment,46 aiming at 
 
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.  Importantly, “[i]nternational law makes clear that 
U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties.”  KOH, supra 
note 9, at 40.  
 41 According to the framework established in the Paris Agreement, the U.S. 
can withdraw after November 4, 2020.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28. 
 42 See e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 185 (2005).  
 43 According to Westlaw and Google Scholar searches targeting cost-benefit 
analysis of U.S. withdrawal, as of July 10, 2019, no studies had been published.  The 
only exception is an earlier note focusing on the moral dimension of cost-benefit 
analysis and related international law principles and contrasting U.S. behavior with 
India’s engagement.  See Carolina Arlota, Cost & Benefit Analysis of the United States’ 
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 1 GNLU J.L. & ECON. 45, 52 (2018). 
 44 This topic is timely because the Trump administration is accused of using 
cost-benefit analysis methodology without scientific criteria.  See Antonio M. Bento 
et al., Flawed Analyses of U.S. Auto Fuel Economy Standards, 362 SCI. 1119, 1119-21 
(2018) (emphasizing fundamental flaws and inconsistencies related to basic 
economic theory and empirical studies in the proposed rule by the current 
administration).  For more information, see Rena Steinzor, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
According to the Trump Administration, REG. REV. (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/23/steinzor-cost-benefit-analysis-
according-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/NB2U-MWWX] (arguing 
that the Trump administration has discredited cost-benefit analysis: “As practiced 
by the Trump Administration, cost-benefit analysis has become a perversion of a 
neutral approach to policymaking.”).  
 45 Cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory tool has different meanings, ranging 
from the normative use of economics to using the criterion of wealth maximization 
when evaluating a particular policy.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 402-03 (7th ed. 2007).  This Article does not distinguish between 
cost-benefit analysis and benefit-cost analysis.  To understand this distinction, see 
Richard O. Zerbe Jr., Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal? Three Rules, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 419, 419-56 (1998) (differentiating benefit-cost analysis).  But see Richard 
O. Zerbe Jr., The Legal Foundation of Cost-Benefit Analysis, U. WASH. 1, 3 n.2 (2007) 
(noting the terms are typically used interchangeably). 
 46  See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND OUR HEALTH (2008). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
892 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
the maximization of overall well-being. 47   This research is 
particularly relevant due to the significant increase in U.S. carbon 
dioxide emissions in 2018.48   The limited improvement in global 
energy efficiency in 2018, attributed to the static energy policy 
environment that year, further advances an interest in the U.S. 
withdrawal.49  
This Article aims to make two significant contributions.  First, 
the goal of this Article is to evaluate the manner in which the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was decided.  This 
procedural account of the cost-benefit analysis illustrates how the 
Trump administration’s decision abruptly departs from reasoned 
regulatory action.  This Article highlights the actions of interest 
groups, the absence of a scientific advisor, and the lack of sound 
scientific studies.  Because of this unreasoned action and the 
corresponding legal uncertainty, litigation is likely to increase. 50  
Given this likely increase, the Article reviews current U.S. litigation 
related to the Paris Agreement.  This Article is the first to review 
current U.S. litigation specifically mentioning the withdrawal of the 
Paris Agreement by name.51  The Article argues that the manner in 
which the administration decided to withdraw contributes to 
increased legal challenges and related transaction costs.  As such, it 
provides new arguments that might be used for future claims. 
Second, this Article focuses on a cost-benefit analysis based on 
substantive accounts, namely, the merits of the withdrawal itself.  It 
 
 47 ”Cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a welfarist decision procedure.  
Cost-benefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the extent that it 
advances overall well-being—that is, the well-being of the public generally, if not 
necessarily every member of the public—relative to alternative decision 
procedures, including the null case of doing nothing.”  ADLER & POSNER, supra note 
24, at 6.  “Public” for purposes of this Article, is the U.S. general population.   
 48 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL ENERGY & CO2 STATUS REPORT: EMISSIONS 7 
(2019). 
 49 Id. at 3.  
 50 See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 400-04 (6th 
ed. 2016) (discussing how legal uncertainty is likely to foster litigation and therefore 
increase transaction costs).  
 51  A Google Scholar search having as criteria “Paris Agreement,” and 
“litigation” in April 2020 shows that previous articles focus on the number of 
lawsuits in the U.S. considering climate litigation, in general.  This literature did not 
control for actual reference to the treaty itself or addressed its withdrawal.  See, e.g., 
Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, The Status of Climate Change Litigation a Global 
Review, U.N. ENV’T 10-14 (May 2017), 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-
Envt-CC-Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8YK-FYES] (providing an overview of 
climate change litigation).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
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examines the challenges in quantifying the withdrawal and 
confronts its domestic and international costs and reputed benefits.  
This research demonstrates that the costs are much higher than the 
arguable benefits, especially due to the disregard of the social cost 
of carbon.  In addition, this Article addresses the role of subnational 
entities and finds that they are unable to compensate for such a 
withdrawal.  This Article also discusses the loss of a window of 
opportunity regarding climate action, the potential consequences 
should the United States be perceived as free riding, and why the 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement ultimately jeopardizes the 
position of the United States as a global leader.  Accordingly, this 
Article contributes to future policy assessments. 
This Article is organized as follows:  Part I, the section you are 
currently reading, provides an overview.  Part II presents a cost-
benefit analysis of the withdrawal, focusing on its procedural terms, 
i.e., the manner in which it was decided.  Part III addresses the costs 
and benefits of the withdrawal based on its substantive terms, i.e., 
targeting the merits, assessing the quantitative and qualitative 
effects of the withdrawal for the country, and the related challenges.  
Part III also considers the international impact of such a withdrawal, 
particularly the costs to the United States.  Part IV concludes that the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not pass the 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis developed in this Article. 
II. THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT IS NOT 
JUSTIFIED BY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BASED ON ITS PROCEDURAL 
ACCOUNT 
This portion of the Article argues that, based on its procedural 
account (the manner by which it was decided and implemented), the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not satisfy the cost-
benefit analysis.  This Article acknowledges that cost-benefit 
analysis, as a technique, is not mandatory to all administration 
policies because it carries its own costs.52  International treaties are 
 
 52 At the federal level, cost-benefit analysis is traditionally required for all 
policies considered significant regulatory actions.  See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51735, § 3 (Sept. 30, 1993) (defining a “significant regulatory action” as one 
with an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more).  These rules are 
subject to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).  
This provision is supplemented by Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, § 3 
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traditionally dismissed due to the foreign affairs exemption. 53  
Reasoned decision-making, however, is a requisite for any 
administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).54  The impact of withdrawal on the U.S. economy is likely to 
be above the general threshold that triggers cost-benefit analysis.55  
A cost-benefit analysis was not required when the APA was 
approved, and it is a relatively new practice.56 
Procedure matters; in fact, the actual consideration of costs and 
benefits57 is indicative of reasoned administrative action, i.e., that it 
is justified and not based on arbitrariness.  Extrapolating the 
requirements of reasoned administrative action to processes 
involving foreign affairs is a logical step.  These matters generally 
demand some level of confidentiality and often entail weighing 
factors relating to national security, emergencies relating to 
international crisis, flexibility, and the global impact of U.S. policy 
 
(Jan. 30, 2017) (regarding reducing regulations and controlling regulatory costs).  
This executive order determines that when an agency considers new regulation it 
should repeal a minimum of two regulations aiming at offsetting the costs of the 
proposed regulation. 
 53 See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, § 4(a) (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 54  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (authorizing judicial 
review and compelling the court to set aside actions found to be “arbitrary and 
capricious, abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law”). 
 55 The threshold is the annual effect of the policy on the economy, which is $100 
million.  See Exec. Order No. 12866, supra note 52.  The EPA estimates that repealing 
the Clean Power Plan, which implements the country’s NDCs under the Paris 
Agreement, could save $33 billion in compliance costs through 2030.  Fact Sheet for 
the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposed-
repeal-cpp-final_oct10.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC3V-Y6ZS].  Withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement easily meets this threshold.  Section B discusses the deficiencies of 
the EPA’s analysis of such repeal. 
 56 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2017) (“The APA was enacted in 1946, and cost-benefit analysis 
became entrenched within the executive branch of the federal government only 
since the 1980s and perhaps as late as 1993 or even 2011.”).  
 57 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-08 (2015) (finding that cost is a 
required consideration for executive agencies).  See Sunstein, supra 56, at 3 
(discussing the rise of the cost-benefit state and the trend of judicial decisions 
requiring cost considerations as indicative of non-arbitrariness). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
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choices.58  Reasoned analysis fosters uniform criteria for policies.59  
Deregulation, which involves removing regulations in place in a 
particular market, needs to be reasoned.60  Such reasoning does not 
need to be exhaustive but should inform the administrative action.  
Where regulatory norms exist, the administration is required to 
justify their revocation of the regulations. 61   Assuming that cost-
benefit analysis is a neutral check on administrative government 
initiatives, deregulatory policies should be restricted by cost-benefit 
analysis in the same manner as regulatory ones.62 
Section A discusses the lack of formal consideration of the actual 
costs and benefits of the withdrawal as indicative of unreasoned 
administrative action.  The absence of a scientific advisor, citations 
to unsound science, repetitive behavior that undermines scientific 
evidence on climate change that is likely attributable to lobbying and 
political factors, and the lack of consideration of alternative policies 
with less stringent consequences are all notable indicators.  Section 
B addresses the potential consequences of the lack of formal cost-
benefit analysis.  Specifically, this section reviews the current U.S. 
litigation on the Paris Agreement, and concludes the withdrawal 
creates significant uncertainty for all actors, thus increasing the 
transaction costs. 
 
 58 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, 282-83 (1973) 
(criticizing the expansion of presidential powers on traditional arguments of 
secrecy and superior expertise of the executive and describing how this led to the 
Vietnam War). 
 59 See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 13 (“Cost-benefit analysis can be 
used to ensure that . . . decisions are based on reasoned analysis and not . . . on the 
unaccountable whim of an official”).  
 60  Cf. Daniel Hemel et al., How Antonin Scalia’s Ghost Could Block Donald 
Trump’s Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/how-antonin-scalias-ghost-
could-block-donald-trumps-wall.html [https://perma.cc/E3X5-DY4E] (quoting 
Justice Scalia explaining how “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly 
more harm than good”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 383, 385 (2019) (“If advocates of CBA are right that CBA functions in 
the administrative state as a neutral check on government initiatives, deregulatory 
policies should be as much restricted by CBA as regulatory ones.”). 
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A. Indications that the Administration Disregarded Costs and Benefits 
A plethora of evidence indicates that the Trump administration 
ignored the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement.  At the time of the decision, the Trump administration 
lacked a director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy,63 
which suggests the administration could not have acted in a 
reasoned manner when deciding to withdraw from the 
Agreement.64  No U.S. president has ever taken so long to fill this 
administrative post.65  Congress understands the need for a science 
advisor to provide the president with “independent, expert 
judgment and assistance on policy matters which require accurate 
assessments of the complex scientific and technological features 
involved.” 66   A scientific advisor would have assisted with the 
technical data, ensuring formal consideration of the costs and 
benefits of withdrawal. 
Further evidence that the withdrawal neglected to weigh the 
costs and benefits is the lack of sound scientific studies supporting 
it.67  Sound scientific evidence, defined in this Article as one based 
 
 63 Commonly known as the science advisor. 
 64 See Neal F. Lane & Michael Riordan, Trump’s Disdain for Science, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/opinion/trump-disdain-
science.html [https://perma.cc/Z9U2-DDN6] (“[T]he lack of good science advice 
has not slowed the president and his administration in their assaults on health and 
environmental policy and in weighing in on national-security issues involving 
science and technology.  His decision to pull the nation out of the Paris climate 
agreement is one example.”). 
 65 See Mythili Sampathkumar, Donald Trump has Not had a Science Advisor for 
Longer than Any Other President, INDEPENDENT (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/white-
house-science-advisor-donald-trump-us-climate-change-global-warming-
a8467076.html [https://perma.cc/LR5B-7PMK] (noting that, at the time, the 
highest-ranked administrator associated with science was a thirty-one-year-old 
with a bachelor’s degree in political science).  The Senate confirmed the extreme-
weather expert Kelvin Droegemeier early this year.  Tony Romm & Ben Guarino, 
Senate Confirms Trump’s Science and Tech Advisor After Lengthy Vacancy, WASH. POST 




 66 42 U.S.C. § 6602 (2020). 
 67 Rachel Becker, Trump Used Misleading Job Stats to Justify Pulling Out of Paris 
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on the best evidence and science available,68 is particularly relevant 
to climate change matters because it avoids bias.  Sound science also 
fosters a common ground approach in the international arena, 
incentivizing countries to cooperate to combat climate change.  
Climate change itself is complex, but scientific knowledge outlining 
broad principles on the topic is unimpeachable.69   Domestically, 
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement contradicts the findings of 
the panel of U.S. experts representing federal agencies.70 
This was not the first time the Trump administration 
contradicted itself.71   It consistently engages in practices that are 
scientifically questionable at the very least; 72  this includes the 
elimination of the projected effects of increased carbon dioxide 
pollution after 2040 in their estimations.73 
Cost-benefit analysis enables reasoned decision-making because 
it clarifies government choices by making them more transparent; 
this analysis aims to isolate government decisions from the effects of 
 
 68 PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11 
(2d ed. 2013). 
 69 See Antony Millner et al., Ambiguity and Climate Policy 3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16050, 2010) (explaining that broad scientific 
principles include laws of thermodynamics and “[carbon dioxide] traps outgoing 
long-wave radiation, causing warming”).  The authors also emphasize that detailed 
empirical predictions based on sophisticated models used to translate such 
principles into predictions may lead to different forecasts.  Id. 
 70 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 35-72. 
 71  The current administration continues to undermine science and climate 
change regulation.  Since 2017, the current administration has attempted to relax or 
remove most of the environmental regulations implemented during the Obama 
administration.  The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is one of many of such 
deregulatory initiatives such as the Clean Water Rule, the Clean Power Plan, and 
the clean car standards. 
 72 The Obama administration engaged in reasoned decision making when 
signing the Paris Agreement.  See Obama, supra note 3.  Meanwhile, the Trump 
administration has been accused of stopping the congressional testimony of a State 
Department senior official regarding climate science.  See Lisa Friedman, White 
House Tried to Stop Climate Science Testimony, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/climate/rod-schoonover-
testimony.html [https://perma.cc/TH8G-U4QU]. 
 73  The administration likely chose to do so because the effects of global 
warming will be particularly severe after 2050.  Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, 
Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-
science.html [https://perma.cc/TEP5-P3D9].  The authors quote Michael 
Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton, who 
criticized the administration, saying “[n]obody in the world does climate science 
like that.  It would be like designing cars without seatbelts or airbags.”  Id.  
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interest groups attempting to advance their agendas. 74   This is 
particularly important in the case of climate change, because the 
main contributors of carbon emissions deny its existence75 and lobby 
to dismiss effective regulation. 76   In addition, Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign was financed by substantial contributions 
from oil tycoons.77  The President’s views on climate change are 
reportedly influenced by friends and donors in the oil industry.78  
This is concerning because relevant experts in the Trump 
administration were against the withdrawal.79  Others would have 
preferred the administration to remain a party to the Agreement, 
although they would have liked to see a reduction in U.S. NDCs.80  
Given that the reasons for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement 
remain unclear, the transparency that accompanies cost-benefit 
analysis is particularly necessary. 
 
 74 See POSNER, supra note 45, at 402-03. 
 75  Major polluters in the U.S. are borrowing the tactics perfected by the 
tobacco industry.  This 1998 quote from the American Petroleum Institute illustrates 
their efforts to discredit scientific knowledge: “Victory will be achieved when . . . 
average citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science; 
recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom’ . . . Those 
promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis of extant science appear to be out of touch 
with reality.”  See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES: THE LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR 
HOLDING BIG OIL ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS 3 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Smoke-Fumes-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G7D5-UCXY] (emphasizing the recurring misleading actions of 
the oil industry across a variety of public and environmental issues). 
 76 Id. at 18-20 (noting the actions of then-CEO of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson, 
who later became Secretary of State).  See also Jane Mayer, In the Withdrawal from the 
Paris Climate Agreement, the Koch Brothers’ Campaign Becomes Overt, NEW YORKER 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-the-
withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement-the-koch-brothers-campaign-
becomes-overt [https://perma.cc/9QNW-BJWE] (discussing President Donald 
Trump’s association with the Koch brothers). 
 77  See Mayer, supra note 76 (connecting President Donald Trump, Vice-
President Mike Pence, and the then-head of the EPA Scott Pruitt to the Koch 
brothers). 
 78 See Davenport & Landler, supra note 73 (discussing the influence of donors 
like investor Carl Icahn and the oil-and-gas billionaire Harold Hamm—both of 
whom “pushed Mr. Trump to deregulate the energy industry”). 
 79 KOH, supra note 9, at 53. 
 80 See Thomas A. Utzinger, Trump Administration Climate Policy and the Paris 
Agreement: Mitigating Factors Will Continue Emissions Reductions, 20 A.B.A. AIR 
QUALITY COMMITTEE NEWSL. 3, 4 (2017).  See also Paris Agreement, supra note 6 art. 
4(11) (recommending each party increase its NDCs).  The treaty does not mandate 
any specific emissions reductions, but its procedural obligations, such as the 
transparency framework, are legally binding.  See Banda, supra note 4, at 331. 
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As much as one is agnostic, the presidential statement raises 
concerns that he was actually catering to his political base at the 
expense of the United States’ best interests. 81   Democrats and 
Republicans are divided on environmental issues. 82   The former 
tend to support related policies, whereas the latter often disregard 
and/or deny climate change.83  This distinct divide between the two 
parties is unique to U.S. politics. 84   When addressing the 
withdrawal, the president presented questionable numbers85  and 
used his campaign slogan, suggesting that political motivations 
rather than reasoned decision-making were at play.86  This indicates 
 
 81 The longest shutdown in United States history, which jeopardized the U.S. 
economy and inflicted significant damages on thousands of public employees, 
demonstrates that President Trump will pander to his base at the expense of U.S. 
residents.  See Jim Tankersley, Shutdown’s Economic Damage Starts to Pile Up, 
Threatening an End to Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/government-shutdown-
economy.html [https://perma.cc/6BMA-A3AH]. 
 82 This divide has not always been the case.  Then-Vice-President George H. 
W. Bush campaigned as the “environmental” president.  Once elected, he 
introduced the cap-and-trade program that controlled acid rain pollution.  See 
Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 
2009), https://www. smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-political-history-
of-cap-and-trade-34711212/ [https://perma.cc/7SKM-6JCE].  President Reagan, 
despite his stance against interventionism, promoted and signed the Montreal 
Protocol on the Conservation of the Ozone Layer based on cost-benefit analysis.  See 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 15 (2018). 
 83  See Matto Mildenberger et al., The Spatial Distribution of Republican and 
Democratic Climate Opinions at State and Local Scales, 145 CLIMATIC CHANGE 539 (2017) 
(emphasizing how the division is not only along party lines but also along state lines).  
It is noteworthy that climate change is now tied to health care on Democratic 
primary voters’ deciding factors.  See Maggie Astor & Lisa Friedman, Beto O’Rourke 
Releases $5 Trillion Climate Change Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/beto-orourke-climate-
change.html [https://perma.cc/6YYX-HJL7].   
 84 In Europe, conservative parties also recognize the need for climate action, 
so the success of Green Parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections is striking.  
See Amy Davidson Sorkin, Europe’s Fragmented Center, NEW YORKER  (June 2, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/europes-fragmented-
center [https://perma.cc/Y6X9-D9BQ]. 
 85 See Jon Greenberg, Fact-Checking Donald Trump’s Statement Withdrawing from 
the Paris Climate Agreement, POLITIFACT (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/jun/01/fact-checking-donald-trumps-
statement-withdrawing-/ [https://perma.cc/PN7Z-CQTS] (stating that President 
Trump relied on a study by NERA Economic Consulting that “makes assumptions 
that gave several economics and environmental professors pause”). 
 86 See Trump, supra note 1 (“The Paris Agreement handicaps the United States 
economy in order to win praise from the very foreign capitalists and global activists 
that have long sought to gain wealth at our country’s expense.  They don’t put 
America first.  I do, and I always will.”).  
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a decision process based on populist governance as opposed to a 
rational determination of what is in the best interest of the American 
people.87 
Another indicator that the Trump administration neglected cost-
benefit analysis as a method to help maximize overall well-being88 
is the omission of alternative policies.89  The president preemptively 
stated the Paris Agreement was exclusively in the interest of foreign 
countries, without considering the benefits to the U.S. of remaining 
party to the treaty. 90   Under international law, the definition of 
“treaty” includes mutual benefits,91 but the Trump administration 
did not acknowledge so.  This is concerning because it departs from 
previous U.S. policy.  In the case of the Paris Agreement, President 
Obama clearly understood that regulating,92 (meaning, in this case, 
committing to voluntary standards aiming at curbing carbon 
emissions) has a net benefit.93  Moreover, the more extreme weather 
events that scientists attribute to climate change, the higher the 
 
 87  President Trump caused controversy when he stated, “I was elected to 
represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”  See Greenberg, supra note 85.  
President Trump referred to a city that has coal and oil—as opposed to considering 
the national interest of the United States.  Id.  
 88 See WEIMER & VINING, supra note 13, at 399-434 (concerning the tenets of 
cost-benefit analysis). 
 89 Trump, supra note 1. 
 90 See Trump, supra note 1 (”As President, I can put no other consideration 
before the wellbeing of American citizens.  The Paris Climate Accord is simply the 
latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the 
United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American 
workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower 
wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 91 Vienna Convention, supra note 40, arts. 2, 26, 27.  See PARK, supra note 68, at 
3 (discussing how the ultimate goal of treaties is the protection of human dignity).  
For an overview of the literature discussing the normative dimension of 
international law, see Allen Buchanan & David Golove, Philosophy of International 
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW 838 
(Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2004). 
 92 See Exec. Order No. 13563, supra note 52, at § 6 (showing that President 
Obama embraced cost-benefit analysis and issued executive orders requesting 
regulatory impact analyses (RIAs), including the requirement that agencies must 
consider their previous estimations in RIAs and assess these in light of the actual 
consequences of a particular action). 
 93 See Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, SCI. 126-29 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/355/
6321/126.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/27TX-23WS] (arguing the Paris Agreement is 
not a partisan issue, as it fosters the U.S.’s low emissions economy and renewable 
energy industry, thereby maintaining U.S.’s economic competitiveness while 
enhancing the country’s climate security). 
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pressure for governmental regulation94—not deregulation.  Hence, 
scrutiny concerning the withdrawal (as a deregulatory policy) 
increases. 
Non-modification of the status quo was not considered, as the 
Trump administration never weighed the benefits of remaining in 
the Paris Agreement or the dangerous consequences of the 
withdrawal.95  Neither was a reduction in U.S. NDCs considered as 
an alternative. 96   The administration made no determination of 
whose costs and benefits count, compiled no catalogue of predicted 
effects and future alterations, performed no calculation of present 
values of net benefits, and offered no related recommendations97—
not even regarding the potential costs of increased pollution after 
the withdrawal. 98   It is worth mentioning that had the U.S. not 
complied with the stipulated targets, no international sanctions 
would have been imposed—the country would not have been 
penalized.99 
B. Consequences of Disregarding Procedural Cost-Benefit Analysis 
By neglecting to consider alternative policies that would result 
in less dire consequences both domestically and internationally, and 
instead withdrawing from the Paris Agreement completely, the 
Trump administration caused significant legal uncertainty in both 
spheres. 
After Trail Smelter in 1941, countries are obligated to refrain from 
causing transboundary harm.100   This prohibition, as well as the 
 
 94 See Michael B. Gerrard, United States Climate Change Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 631 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et 
al. eds., 2016). 
 95  The Obama administration engaged in reasoned decision-making when 
joining the Paris Agreement, because the President justified the net benefits of 
joining the Agreement, including job creation in renewable energy.  See Obama, 
supra note 3. 
 96 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(11) (recommending that each party to 
the agreement increase its NDCs). 
 97 WEIMER & VINING, supra note 13, at 404.  For details on cost-benefit analysis, 
see also OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003). 
 98 Trump, supra note 1. 
 99 Nuccitelli, supra note 7. 
 100  The Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) involved a Canadian smelter that 
produced fumes that caused damages to Washington State.  The tribunal ruled that 
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duty to compensate (the “polluter pays” principle),101 means that 
state responsibility is a double-edged sword, and the international 
regime both assumes harm will occur and encourages preventing 
that harm.102  More recently, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 
1992 Rio Declaration also obligate countries not to cause 
transboundary harm, although the obligation is not absolute. 103  
However, countries are required to undertake due diligence104 and, 
perhaps most importantly, the obligation has become part of 
customary international law.105  Moreover, in the domestic sphere, if 
the EPA has reason to believe that any air pollutants emitted in the 
United States “cause or contribute to air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a 
foreign country,” the agency must act.106  These two factors strongly 
suggest the U.S. withdrawal is not justified under a cost-benefit 
analysis based on the procedural account, because withdrawal may 
subject the country to international scrutiny and potential liability 
for climate harm, while increasing uncertainty about applicable 
laws. 
Analysis of such uncertainty is relevant because the current 
administration’s deregulation efforts have been met with an 
 
the activity of the smelter needed to be reduced and regulated in accordance with 
the regime determined in the award.  Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 
Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1941)  
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZZ2-
C7R8].  In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, Trail Smelter 
determined that, under the “polluter pays” principle, the polluting state must 
compensate for the transboundary harm it caused.  See Rebecca M. Bratspies & 
Russel A. Miller, Transboundary Harm in International Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 3 (Rebecca M. 
Bratspies & Russel A. Miller eds., 2006). 
 101 Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 100.  See also Bratspies & Miller, supra 
note 100, at 4 (emphasizing the modern declaration of state responsibility for 
transboundary harm, while criticizing the narrowness of the decision, because the 
defendant was held liable only if the resulting harm was of “serious economic 
consequence”). 
 102 Bratspies & Miller, supra note 100, at 9. 
 103 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Env’t, princ. 
22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1972); Rep. of the United Nations Conference 
on Env’t and Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992). 
 104 Jesse L. Reynolds, International Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 
116 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018). 
 105 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 226 (July 8), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-
19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCW-B2KQ]. 
 106 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (2020). 
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unprecedented low success rate in domestic courts.107  Research on 
deregulation efforts related to the environment and public health 
shows the Trump administration has suffered significant and 
recurrent losses in court since the inauguration. 108   The Trump 
administration intends to repeal the Clean Power Plan, 109 which is 
crucial to achieve the U.S. NDCs.110  The EPA claims the repeal will 
save $33 billion in avoided compliance costs through 2030.111  As this 
calculation is disputed, litigation ensued.112  Other recent changes 
relating to cost-benefit analysis in general are also dubious.113  Such 
changes are particularly concerning because the Clean Power Plan 
 
 107 See Anna M. Phillips, In California vs. Trump, the State is Winning Nearly All 
its Environmental Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-california-trump-environmental-
lawsuits-20190507-story.html [https://perma.cc/TN4N-Z2CV] (“Legal experts 
said they couldn’t recall agencies under any recent president having such a low 
success rate in court.”).  
 108  See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y 
INTEGRITY (last visited Apr. 24, 2020), https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-
roundup [https://perma.cc/QXP5-ZU2T] (tracking the outcome of litigation 
involving the Trump administration’s deregulation efforts).  
 109 Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan: Proposal, 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-
pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan-0 
[https://perma.cc/F7EF-AE33]. 
 110 See Anna McGinn, Understanding the Paris Agreement, SCHOLARS STRATEGY 
NETWORK (Apr. 12, 2019), https://scholars.org/contribution/understanding-paris-
agreement [https://perma.cc/V6KA-8V8G] (explaining that the NDCs 
contributions of the U.S. were based almost entirely on the Clean Power Plan). 
 111 Fact Sheet for the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, supra note 55. 
 112 See Stuart Shapiro, A Recipe for Improving Regulatory Analysis, REG. REV. 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/28/shapiro-improving-
regulatory-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/8W94-CYJX] (explaining that, under the 
Trump administration, regulatory agencies have been criticized for their use of 
“shoddy analysis” and for concealing the regulatory process from the public). 
 113  The EPA’s fact sheet acknowledges other changes that differ from the 
Obama administration: No longer are domestic costs compared to domestic 
benefits, nor is energy efficiency viewed as a benefit but rather as an avoided cost 
showing “the true magnitude of the Clean Power Plant’s costs.”  See Fact Sheet for 
the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, supra note 55.  See also Valuing Climate 
Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., 
ENGINEERING, & MED. 51 (2017) (disputing the administration’s focus on domestic 
contributions instead of considering the global impact of emissions and climate 
change); SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 159 (contending the change from global to 
domestic emissions is unjustified as “the height of arbitrariness”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
904 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
is an example of how stable regulation fosters voluntary climate 
action.114 
In such context, litigation over Trump administration policies on 
climate change has increased, 115  also following international 
strategies.  Globally, when seeking redress from damages arising 
from climate change, plaintiffs focused on private parties, such as 
corporations. 116   Recently, the lawsuits expanded to include 
governments,117 with citizens and non-governmental organizations 
basing their claims on international treaties. 118   Therefore, it is 
 
 114 See Lily Hsueh, Credible and Stable Regulation Encourages Voluntary Climate 
Action, REG. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/19/hsueh-credible-stable-regulation-
voluntary-climate-action/ [https://perma.cc/2BLV-9M2L] (arguing that under the 
Clean Power Plan, companies increased transparency regarding their carbon 
emissions). 
 115 For a comprehensive study on environmental litigation during the first 
year of the Trump presidency, see Dena P. Adler, U.S. Climate Change Litigation in 
the Age of Trump: Year One, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. 
(2018), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2018/02/Adler-2018-02-U.S.-
Climate-Change-Litigation-in-the-Age-of-Trump-Year-One.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4AP-YKJA].  See also Dena P. Adler, U.S. Climate Change 
Litigation in the Age of Trump: Year Two, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE L. 16-21 (2019), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2019/06/Adler-
2019-06-US-Climate-Change-Litigation-in-Age-of-Trump-Year-2-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4SQ-4XG6] (emphasizing how certain climate litigation 
actually supports the administration’s deregulatory policies, despite the 
government not having won a case). 
 116 Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for 
Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 846 (2018). 
 117  Environmentalists are pursuing a strategy known as litigate-to-mitigate, 
believing judges are “less likely than politicians to be influenced by oil, coal, and 
gas companies”.  See Jonathan Watts, ‘We Should Be on the Offensive’—James Hansen 
Calls for Wave of Climate Lawsuits, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/17/we-should-be-on-
the-offensive-james-hansen-calls-for-wave-of-climate-lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/GS9Y-2CSM].  In the United States, twenty-one 
environmentalists who are too young to vote, calling themselves guardians of 
future generations, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
U.S. president and several executive agencies.  The plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that 
GHG emissions from carbon dioxide—produced by burning fossil fuels—
jeopardize the environment, violating their due process and that the defendants 
“violated their obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for the people 
and for future generations.”  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224, 1233 
(D. Or. 2016). 
 118 The case often referenced is Urgenda Found. v. Kingdom of Netherlands (2015), 
in which the plaintiffs argued the Dutch government’s then-recently enacted 
reduction of GHG emissions was insufficient to achieve the country’s contribution 
to the Paris Agreement goals.  See Burger & Gundlach, supra note 51, at 15 
(providing a discussion of the case). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1
2020] United States' Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 905 
unsurprising that plaintiffs have initiated litigation specifically 
related to the Paris Agreement. 119   A Hawaiian Supreme Court 
decision mentions the Paris Agreement in the context of advancing 
environmental protections. 120   Another decision invokes the 
Agreement to dismiss claims that a single polluter could not affect 
GHG emissions.121  Other courts are less sympathetic.122  The only 
case that refers to the U.S. withdrawal from the Agreement does so 
incidentally and dismisses a removal based on a federal question.123 
However, as an updated communication concerning the U.S. 
intent to withdraw was issued in November 2019, related litigation 
involving presidential limits to unilaterally withdraw may follow.124  
Although the U.S. president has significant authority regarding 
foreign affairs (and related political-question doctrine),125 he must 
comply with legal requirements. 126   Commentators argue that 
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from NAFTA should be 
barred due to congressional authority to regulate commerce under 
 
 119 The Westlaw database was used to search “Paris Agreement” in federal 
and state courts.  With false positives removed, as of July 10, 2019, only four cases 
actually referred to the Agreement. 
 120 In re. Haw. Elec. Light Co., 445 P.3d 673, 695 n.21 (Haw. 2019). 
 121 See Cleveland Nat’l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts, 397 P.3d 
989, 1000 (Cal. 2018) (”The fact that a regional plan’s contribution to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is likely to be small on a statewide level is not necessarily 
a basis for concluding that its impact will be insignificant in the context of a 
statewide goal.”). 
 122 See Western Org. of Res. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 
2018 WL 1456624, at *14 (D. Mont. Mar. 23, 2018) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims 
that the social cost of the carbon and global carbon budget—both based on the Paris 
Agreement—should be used in a NEPA cost-benefit analysis, the court held that 
the plaintiffs had no case). 
 123 Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538, 550, 559 (D. Md. 2019).  
 124 KOH, supra note 9, at 50 (explaining that this might be a possibility because 
the withdrawal can only be effective after three years of entry into force of the Paris 
Agreement).  The text of the Agreement only determines when the actual 
withdrawal can take effect but does not explicitly require the communication to be 
within a year before the intended withdrawal.  Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 
28.  As previously stated, the U.S. confirmed its intent to withdrawal in Nov. 4, 
2019.  See Friedman, supra note 8. 
 125  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
140-43 (6th ed. 2006) (noting the difficulty in determining which foreign policy 
issues are justifiable and which actually present political questions). 
 126  See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (redrawing the legal 
boundaries of presidential powers involving the denunciation of treaties).  Chief 
Justice John Roberts asserted that the political question doctrine did not bar judicial 
review.  Id. at 201.  See also KOH, supra note 9, at 173-74 (discussing the omission in 
Zivotofsky of the famous political question test introduced in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962)). 
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the Commerce Clause.127  Using the same rationale, scholars argue 
withdrawing from a climate change agreement, which has a 
significant impact on domestic and foreign commerce, would also 
be prohibited.128 
Finally, the uncertainty caused by the unreasoned withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement 129  is also likely to increase domestic 
litigation, at the very least.  After all, the more uncertain a particular 
rule or its interpretation is, the higher the likelihood that the parties 
will refrain from negotiating, 130  and instead pursue litigation.  
Accordingly, the transaction costs for all domestic and foreign actors 
involved in environmental, energy, and related areas will likely 
increase.131 
III. THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS BASED ON ITS SUBSTANTIVE TERMS 
This Part assesses the costs and benefits of the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, focusing on its merits rather than how 
the decision was reached and implemented (see Part II for 
information on the procedure).  Part III addresses whether the 
withdrawal produces more benefits than costs both qualitatively 
(analyzing the descriptive data) and quantitatively (examining the 
numerical data).  Section A discusses the challenges of such an 
assessment.  Section B explores the domestic costs of the withdrawal, 
followed by its arguable benefits in Section C.  Section D analyzes 
the impact of the U.S. decision at the global level.  It is worth 
reiterating that the baseline for this research is the withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement itself, so the benefits that accrued during the 
 
 127 KOH, supra note 9, at 50-51. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Because the withdrawal was not justified at the time, additional questions 
about it keep occurring, contributing to more uncertainty.  In July 2019, the head of 
the EPA wrongfully argued that § 115 of the Clean Air Act would make the Paris 
targets domestically binding.  See Jean Chemnick, Wheeler: Obscure Air Provision 
Behind Paris Withdrawal, CLIMATE WIRE (July 15, 2019). 
 130 All things being equal, investors will look for the reduced risk opportunity. 
This is based on the economic assumptions that human beings are reluctant to 
change (status quo bias) and generally risk-averse.  For more information, see 
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-203 (1991). 
 131  Legal uncertainty often leads to litigation, which increases transaction 
costs.  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 400-04. 
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Agreement that will be terminated once the withdrawal is 
implemented are included.  In this vein, a methodological note is 
required.  A cost-benefit analysis performed by a U.S. agency may 
be limited to the consideration of the interests of the country’s 
citizens.132  Nonetheless, cost-benefit analyses of policies on topics 
related to foreign affairs have previously considered the interests of 
those outside the United States.133  This Part considers these interests 
because climate change encompasses collective rights beyond 
national borders.134 
A. The Challenges of Measuring the Costs and Benefits of the 
Withdrawal 
Quantifying the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is 
not a trivial task, due to the complexity of climate change and its 
impact. 135   Estimations include market damages (infrastructure, 
tourism, and increased energy demand), and non-market damages 
(ecological impact and culture values, often measured in terms of 
“willingness to pay”). 136   Predictions are perennially affected by 
uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information regarding future 
emission of GHGs, the effects of past and future emission on the 
climate system, the impact of changes in climate on the physical and 
biological environment, and the translation of such environmental 
 
 132 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97. 
 133 See, e.g., Lynn A. Karoly & Francisco Perez-Arce, A Cost-Benefit Framework 
for Analyzing the Economic and Fiscal Impacts of State-Level Immigration Policies, RAND 
CORP. (2016); Carolina Arlota, Is the Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) Justified by the Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 29  BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 93 
(2018). 
 134 See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 123-200 (2010) (arguing that environmental policy 
should include the interests of existing members of the political community as well 
as those of people overseas, future generations, and even other species). 
 135 There is no consensus as to when climate change-related costs will incur or 
the monetary amount of those costs.  ERIC POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2013). 
 136  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change, 212 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DP6X-9HCH]. 
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effects into economic damages.137   The current literature consists 
primarily of studies focusing on the consequences of the U.S. 
withdrawal on climate governance. 138   Studies addressing the 
quantitative impact of the U.S. withdrawal are scarce and based on 
incomplete modeling assumptions.  A recent study finding potential 
economic gain for carbon-intense energy sectors, for example, 
neglects to address environmental costs.139 
Estimating the impact of the withdrawal involves additional 
challenges.  The effects of recently enacted policies by U.S. cities,140 
states,141 and international actors (parties to the Paris Agreement, 
U.N. organs, and non-governmental organizations [NGOs])142 are 
 
 137 Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States 
Government,  Technical Support Document: - Technical Update on the Social Cost of 
Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Order 12866, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY  3 (2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CDH-7S5H].  
 138 See, e.g., Zhang Hai-Bin et al., U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: 
Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 220, 222 
(2017); Miranda Schreurs, The European Union and the Paris Climate Agreement: 
Moving Forward Without the United States, 15 CHINESE J. POPULATION RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 192, 192 (2017). 
 139  Duy Nong & Mahinda Siriwardana, Effects on the U.S. Economy of its 
Proposed Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: A Quantitative Assessment, 159 ENERGY 
621, 623 (2018). 
 140 New York City intends to rid itself of $5 billion of investments it has made 
in fossil fuel companies and reduce its carbon emissions.  Oliver Milman, New York 




 141 Several states, led by California and New York, are setting their own limits 
for GHG emissions.  Thirty-four U.S. states are committed to reducing global 
warming despite President Trump’s decision.  See Chelsea Harvey, These are the 
States Fighting to Save the Earth, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/04/trumps-domestic-war-
climate-action-has-propelled-states-battle/" [https://perma.cc/EM8Y-K6UW].  In 
addition, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade system of 
cooperation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector, includes 
nine states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).  See Program Overview and 
Design, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE INITIATIVE (2018), 
https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements 
[https://perma.cc/5AEA-4TTD].  
 142  In April 2019, the Canadian federal government extended its carbon-
pricing program by imposing a tax on fossil fuels in the four provinces that had 
declined to enact their own climate action plans.  See Brad Plumer & Nadja 
Popovich, These Countries Have Prices on Carbon. Are They Working?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
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unclear.  Meanwhile, President Trump directed agencies to review 
(modify, suspend, or rescind) regulations that may “unduly 
burden” energy development—including those aimed at reducing 
GHG emissions.143 
Another relevant challenge in quantifying “before” and “after” 
withdrawal scenarios is how to measure potential adaptation to 
climate change.  Specific data is not available.  Adaptation is not the 
best approach to curb emissions,144 and climate change is a dynamic 
event scientists are still trying to understand. 145   The volatile 
approach the Trump administration is taking in many areas 
increases the complexity of the assessment.  If the trade war with 
China continues, for instance, emissions may be reduced, whereas if 
the President succeeds in expanding the U.S. economy by 5% or 6%, 
emissions will likely increase.146  The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, in and of itself, opened the country to carbon-tariff 
conflicts, as China and the European Union may impose retaliatory 
tariffs on all goods imported from the United States.147 
 
2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/02/climate/pricing-
carbon-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/X4AL-X34N].  See also State and Trends of 
Carbon Pricing Report, WORLD BANK GROUP (May 2018) (listing the forty countries 
with carbon prices). 
 143 Exec. Order No.13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).  
 144 BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL ET AL., FACT AND FICTION IN GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY 
187 (2016). 
 145 Id. at 184-85.  
 146 Kate Larsen et al., Taking Stock 2017: Trump’s Regulatory Rollback Begin, 
RHODIUM GROUP (Mar. 27, 2017), https://rhg.com/research/trumps-regulatory-
rollback-begins/ [https://perma.cc/2EKR-L2HV].  
 147 Christoph Böhringer & Thomas F. Rutherford, U.S. Withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement: Economic Implications of Carbon-Tariff Conflicts, HARV. PROJECT ON 
CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (Aug. 2017); Edward Taylor, German Carmakers Fear Losing 
Competitive Edge After U.S. Paris Exit, REUTERS (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-german-
carmakers/german-carmakers-fear-losing-competitive-edge-after-u-s-paris-exit-
idUSKBN18T1Q0 [https://perma.cc/TRH8-WC8J] (following the announcement 
of the U.S. withdrawal, German interest groups expressed concerns about the 
competitiveness of their automobiles in relation to those produced in the United 
States). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
910 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
B. The Domestic Costs of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement 
As discussed in Part II, the Trump administration disregarded 
the benefits of remaining in the Paris Agreement and the costs of 
rescinding it.  The United States will bear the costs of implementing 
the withdrawal, which have not been publicized yet.  No estimations 
of the effects of the withdrawal were considered.148  Astonishingly, 
not even environmental costs were accounted for.149 
The presidential announcement was also silent on the social cost 
of carbon,150 the present value of which is measured as the damages 
incurred by the presence of an additional ton of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere. 151   The social cost of carbon is of paramount 
importance in climate policy,152 although estimating it is notoriously 
difficult.153  Predictions for this cost are even more complex when 
focusing solely on the domestic level, due to the limited empirical 
literature addressing regions or a single country. 154   The EPA 
previously estimated the social cost of carbon as $42 for 2020—
 
 148 Nuccitelli, supra note 7. 
 149 See Trump, supra note 1 (summarizing his claims, the President stated: 
“This agreement is less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a 
financial advantage over the United States.  The rest of the world applauded when 
we signed the Paris Agreement—they went wild; they were so happy—for the 
simple reason that it put our country, the United States of America, which we all 
love, at a very, very big economic disadvantage.”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 10 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1518, 1518 (2017). 
 152 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
538 F.3d 1172, 1203 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that agency regulations must 
consider the social cost of carbon).  See also Daniel A. Farber, Coping with Uncertainty: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Precautionary Principle, and Climate Change, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
1659, 1708-09 (2015) (elaborating on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center for 
Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration). 
 153 Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 
137, at 1 (describing how monetized damages associated with an incremental 
increase in carbon emissions per year are intended to include—but are not limited 
to—human health, net agricultural productivity, property damages from increased 
flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change). 
 154 Id. at 11. 
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assuming a 3% discount rate, 155  which is disputable. 156   Experts 
contend the social cost of carbon is typically underestimated in 
climate policies.157  The National Academy of Sciences argues that 
global warming is subject to global emissions, so damages should be 
considered globally. 158   The Trump administration disagrees, 
although it did not provide a reason,159 and its proposed new rule 
estimates the social cost of carbon from $1 to $6.160 
In light of these omissions and controversies, it is vital to analyze 
costs in specific defining terms, which includes cost as a relational 
concept, i.e., focusing on defining the interests involved before 
calling it a cost or a benefit.161  This application of the notion of cost 
as a relational concept 162 requires a nuanced understanding that 
 
 155 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FACT SHEET (Dec. 2016), 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html 
[https://perma.cc/3LR8-6G9P] (showing values as of 2016). 
 156 Id. (acknowledging one of the most difficult challenges regarding the social 
cost of carbon estimations is the calculation of discount rates).  See also Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J., 1981, 2051 (1998) 
(criticizing discounting assumptions, specifically the use of income-influence 
economic methods of valuing life, and concluding that assuming an increase future 
income implies that future lives are more worth than current ones); Douglas A. 
Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 579 (2004). 
 157 See Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of 
Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173, 174-75 (2014) (discussing discounting rates and the 
fact that models tend to omit damages to labor productivity and growth 
productivity, among other factors). 
 158 NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., supra note 113, at 50-51. 
 159 The Trump administration’s departure from the previous use of the global 
figure for the social cost of carbon in favor of the domestic figure is a decision that 
“may or may not be justifiable. But it was not justified. No explanation was given. 
That is the high of arbitrariness, and it should be invalidated in court.”  SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 82, at 159. 
 160 Jason Bordoff, Trump vs. Obama on the Social Cost of Carbon—and Why It 
Matters, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/11/15/trump-vs-obama-on-the-social-cost-
of-carbon-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/H3DL-M53D].  During the 
Trump administration, scientists subjected the EPA’s proposed new regulation on 
the Clean Power Plan to significant criticism because it disregarded, for instance, 
the impact of global emissions.  By considering only domestic emissions, it 
ultimately increased costs while reducing the benefits of regulatory action, which 
contributed to lowering the social cost of carbon significantly.  Id.  See also criticisms 
by the NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., supra note 113.  
 161 WARREN J. SAMUELS ET AL., THE ECONOMY AS A PROCESS OF VALUATION 216-
31 (1997). 
 162 See Daniele Bertolini & Carolina Arlota, Why Michigan v. EPA Requires that 
the Meaning of the Cost/Rationality Nexus Be Clarified, 29 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 
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benefits to some are costs to others.163  Even if costs are considered 
in relational terms, it would not validate the U.S. withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement, as this Section demonstrates.  After all, whose 
interests count?  Whose interests does the withdrawal benefit?  As 
the time of this writing, it remains unclear whose interests the 
administration officially took into account.164 
The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the resulting 
increase of carbon emissions affects a myriad of interests.  Because 
an increase in GHGs is among the leading cause of climate change, 
rain, snow, tornados, flooding, droughts, tsunamis, famine, and 
natural disasters will occur more frequently across the globe after 
the U.S. withdrawal.165  The cleaning and removal of debris carries 
significant costs and requires input from all levels of government 
and assistance from the entire community. 166   Climate change 
negatively affects health, causing illnesses that incapacitate and 
even kill.167  This decreases productivity, devastates family unity, 
and related social networks. 168   Natural disasters will increase 
demand for hospital care and emergency services.  Healthcare 
companies and insurers will raise their prices accordingly.  The 
changes will jeopardize wildlife, water sources, and the overall 
global ecosystem.169 
The specific consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement on the country’s population will be severe.  Travel will 
be disrupted due to destruction of infrastructure.  Energy services 
and electronic communication may be interrupted more 
 
155 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court neglected to consider cost as a relational 
concept). 
 163 See SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 161, at 216-34. 
 164  See Trump, supra note 1 (noting that while the presidential statement 
mentions loss of jobs, it refers to a study that did not consider job creation in the 
green economy). 
 165  For a legal discussion about the causes of climate change and their 
connection with such disasters, see CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
LAW 5-31 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. ed., 2009). 
 166 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 15, at 1. 
 167 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 
1.5°C, 11-12 (2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Y3D-NQD9] (explaining the increase in number of deaths as 
well as the costs of malnutrition, respiratory conditions, infectious vector-borne 
diseases and other public health costs).  
 168 Id. at 9-11 (discussing global predictions on the increase in temperature that 
the Paris Agreement aims to avoid). 
 169 Id. at 11-12.  
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frequently. 170   Family and friends will not see each other and 
business may falter or go under completely.  Banks may lose their 
investments in new clean-energy technology that would have been 
needed under the Paris Agreement.  Tourism activities will be 
adversely impacted.  Residents may be forced to migrate within the 
United States.  Refugees whose lands are no longer fertile and/or 
cannot live in their own countries due to desertification or 
significant change in the weather will consider immigrating to the 
United States.171  This, at a minimum, will increase the U.S. budget, 
compromising economic resources.  Even as this occurs, money will 
need to be spent to rebuild infrastructure as opposed to investing in 
improvements.  Finally, because of the withdrawal, the U.S. military 
may face more challenges abroad.172 
Rising sea levels are perhaps the most indicative evidence 
available of global warming.173  A more significant change in water 
levels in addition to increased water pollution174 is likely to occur 
after the U.S. withdrawal.175  In the United States, 91% of electricity 
is produced by thermoelectric (nuclear and fossil-fueled) power 
plants, which rely on the availability of water resources and depend 
 
 170  JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 730-31 
(Foundation Press 5th ed. 2015). 
 171  Statistics on the predicted refugee population vary significantly.  A 
renowned study estimates that by 2050, there will be approximately 150 million 
refugees who have left their homes due to the consequences of global warming.  See 
Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE 
752, 753 (1993). 
 172 This argument is based generally on the congressional assessment.  See 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 23, at 1358. 
 173 Even with the Paris Agreement in place, the current scenario is alarming.  
A recent study shows that the rate of ice loss in Greenland in 2012 was of 400 billion 
tons per year, almost four times the rate in 2013.  See John Schwartz, Greenland’s 
Melting Ice Nears a “Tipping Point,” Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/climate/greenland-ice.html 
[https://perma.cc/DL46-HFSA]. 
 174 Water pollution is among the most severe consequences of climate change.  
See P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationary is Dead: Whither Water Management, 319 SCI. 573, 
573 (2008) (emphasizing that researchers have had to change their assumptions, 
such as their belief that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope 
of variability, due to climate change). 
 175  See THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
(Robert Mendelsohn & James E. Neuman eds., 2004) (providing an early (and 
detailed) attempt to quantify the economic impact of climate change in the United 
States).  The work cites multiple studies estimating the cost of damages caused by 
climate change as 1.5% to 2% of the U.S. GDP.  Id. at 2. 
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on them to be a certain temperature.176   As such, an increase in 
temperature will affect the cooling of water necessary in the 
production of electricity.  Electricity production will suffer should 
the availability of water significantly change or decrease. 177  
Meanwhile, heating and air conditioning will be used more often, 
increasing energy consumption and GHG emissions. 
Research shows that an increase in the average summer 
temperature negatively affects all industries, not only those most 
assume will suffer such as fishing, tourism, and agriculture. 178 
Industries such as retail, wholesale, services, finances, and 
construction, which jointly represent more than a third of the U.S. 
gross domestic product (GDP), will suffer, whereas very few sectors 
such as utilities (1.8% of GDP) would benefit from an increase in 
temperature.179 
Recent research shows that the extreme heat waves of the 
summer of 2018 are not an isolated incident. 180   Predictions 
considering the long-term effect of higher temperatures estimate 
GDP will decrease by as much as 10% from 2070 to 2099, with 
reductions being more significant in the higher emission scenario 
considered by the World Bank.181 
Documented weather events leading to extreme heat and 
droughts have been recorded in U.S. states since 1880.182   Texas, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Louisiana lost three million acres due 
to wildfires, suffering $6 to $8 billion in losses due to record-
breaking summer heat in 2011.183  Early in 2019, California electricity 
 
 176 Michelle T. H. van Vliet et al., Vulnerability of U.S. and European Electricity 
Supply to Climate Change, 1546 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 676, 676 (2012). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Ric Colacito et al., Climate Change and the Cost of Inaction, VOX CEPR POL’Y 
PORTAL (Oct. 28, 2016), https://voxeu.org/article/climate-change-and-cost-
inaction [https://perma.cc/SX8B-UEZ2]. 
 179 Id. 
 180  See M. M. Vogel et al., Concurrent 2018 Hot Extremes Across Northern 
Hemisphere due to Human-Induced Climate Change, EARTH’S FUTURE 692, 702 (2019) 
(finding the planet is entering a “new climate regime,” with “extraordinary” heat 
waves intensified by global warming). 
 181 See Colacito et al., supra note 178 (noting that the impact per year on GDP 
is not significant in the short term). 
 182 Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided, WORLD BANK 
[WB] 18 (2012), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAs
ciiFileName0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P75-BVA6].  The World Bank calls 
mitigation action the best insurance against uncertain future.  Id. at 2. 
 183 Id. at 18. 
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provider Pacific Gas and Electric declared bankruptcy due to 
billions of dollars in liability costs accrued during two years of 
wildfires.184  In the first half of the same year, floods and tornadoes 
in the Midwest caused over $12.5 billion in damages. 185   It is 
noteworthy that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
estimates, with high confidence, that extreme events may be more 
devastating economically than the impact of climate change 
overall. 186   Nevertheless, residences and private businesses, and 
schools, universities, and other public institutions, will incur greater 
costs as people adapt their surroundings to become more resilient to 
the effects of climate change, from rising temperatures to natural 
catastrophes. 
Certain segments of the population will feel the effects of climate 
change and extreme weather much more than others.  This 
regressive nature of carbon-pricing means consumers bear the costs, 
and those with lower incomes who spend a greater percentage of 
their income on non-discretionary goods and services will suffer 
more.187  If it is true that climate change does not affect people in 
isolation, it certainly affects the less well-off disproportionally, in a 
vicious cycle.188   In addition, native and indigenous peoples will 
experience more difficulties due to their lifestyles, which rely more 
on nature.189  Remaining in the Agreement is therefore justified on a 
distributional basis under prioritarianism, the understanding that 
 
 184 See Coral Davenport, Climate Change Poses Major Risks to Financial Markets, 
Regulator Warns, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/climate/climate-financial-market-
risk.html [https://perma.cc/M2PA-TJQT] (noting that some experts believe that 
bankruptcy “could be an early indicator of a wider economic toll” due to climate 
change, as it makes wildfires “more frequent and destructive”). 
 185 Erin Ailworth, After Months of Floods and Tornadoes, Midwest Officials Tally 
Billions in Damage, WALL STREET J. (July 4, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-months-of-floods-and-tornadoes-midwest-
officials-tally-billions-in-damage-11562232602 [https://perma.cc/JVB5-TE76]. 
 186 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 136, at 212. 
 187 TREBILCOCK, supra note 28, at 121. 
 188 See Mark Nuttall, Environmental Institutions and Governance, WILEY ONLINE 
LIBRARY 1, 3 (2018) (contending that climate change does not affect people in 
isolation, but may impact indigenous people more severely). 
 189  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 167, at 11 
(emphasizing, with high confidence, that indigenous peoples, coastal and island 
populations, and developing world inhabitants would be more exposed to the 
consequences of climate change). 
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regulations should maximize the well-being of all, with priority 
given to those who are worse off.190 
The economic impact of climate change on the U.S. economy 
worries market experts.  Recently, a top financial regulator who sits 
on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission—a powerful 
agency that oversees major financial markets including grain 
futures, oil trading, and complex derivatives—posited that financial 
risks from climate change are comparable to those posed by the 
mortgage meltdown that triggered the 2008 financial crisis.191  As 
climate change causes volatile weather events to occur more 
frequently, larger providers of financial products—mortgages, 
pensions, insurance, real estate—will not be able to shift risk away 
from their portfolios. 192   More significant, perhaps, is that U.S. 
companies, which make up the vast majority of the top 400 
companies in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) report, 
underreport the risks of climate change, pegging it at $110 billion 
(10% of the global risks reported to CDP).193 
President Trump cited economic motivations such as protecting 
the U.S. economy, particularly U.S. jobs.194  A few commentators 
eagerly agreed that withdrawal would be good for the U.S. economy 
while having little effect on climate change.195  This, of course, does 
not align with the best scientific data—economics included. 196  
Effective policy-making is based on the assessment of complete 
 
 190 Mathew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian View, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1478, 1478-79 (2009). 
 191 Davenport, supra note 184. 
 192 Id.; see also The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from Climate 
Change, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2015) (finding that approximately 30% of 
the world’s total stock of manageable assets may be at risk due to climate change, 
and stressing that costs associated with climate change are a significant blind 
spot for companies and their investors). 
 193  See Global Climate Change Analysis 2018, CDP 6 (2018), 
https://www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/global-climate-change-report-
2018 [https://perma.cc/S389-XCDP] (recommending investors and policymakers 
focus on demanding improved climate-related risk assessments from companies 
headquartered in the United States). 
 194 Trump, supra note 1. 
 195 See Paris Climate Discord: U.S. Emissions Targets Could Trap Trump if He Stays 
in the Accord, WALL STREET J. (May 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-
climate-discord-1496272448 [https://perma.cc/M3EM-MHZ8] (“The reality is that 
withdrawing [from the Paris Agreement] is in America’s economic interest and 
won’t matter much to the climate.”).  
 196 For details, see Part II, Section B and Part III, Section C. 
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policy impacts, including ancillary costs and ancillary benefits.197  In 
U.S. policymaking, “the heuristic bias in favour of avoiding certain 
losses may lead to an under-weighing of catastrophic scenarios of 
climate change, at least in the context of U.S. policy-making.”198  
Moreover, the Trump administration has a reputation for focusing 
on costs while neglecting benefits.199  Even when the administration 
actually engages in cost-benefit analysis, research finds it to be 
significantly flawed.200 
In contrast, President Obama clearly believed the Paris 
Agreement benefitted the United States, as it would create “more 
jobs and economic growth driven by low-carbon investment.”201 
This is in line with European Union policy regarding climate 
change.202  Many European countries have combined their desire to 
protect the environment with their interest in technology.  They 
understand that to remain competitive, they need to be at the 
forefront of science and renewable energy.203 
This is one reason why significant economical actors such as 
Shell, Apple, Walmart, Exxon Mobil, and General Electric support 
 
 197  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution and Climate Change, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 171 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et 
al. eds., 2016) (emphasizing the need for cost-effectiveness in the application of the 
precautionary principle).  For an in-depth discussion about ancillary harms and 
benefits, see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 151-70. 
 198  David Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 
QUEEN’S L.J., 67, 69 (2009). 
 199 SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 159. 
 200 Farber, supra note 62, at 431.  Farber also states, “President Trump has 
placed agenda controls on agencies that focus primarily on eliminating regulatory 
costs rather than maximizing regulatory benefits.  The Administration has also 
begun initiatives to limit the evidence that can be considered in EPA cost-benefit 
analysis and to eliminate an important class of regulatory benefits from 
consideration.”  Id. 
 201 Obama, supra note 3.  
 202 The European Union is famous for its environmental policies and its “win-
win” negotiation strategy, which emphasizes the economic benefits of 
environmental protection.  See Dimitrov, supra note 40, at 9. 
 203  Schreurs, supra note 138.  In addition to leaving the Paris Agreement, 
President Trump authorized oil drilling in Alaska, a decision ruled unlawful in 
League of Conservation Voters v. Donald J. Trump.  See League of Conservation Voters 
v. Trump, 303 F. Supp.3d 985 (D. Alaska 2018).  Meanwhile, Norway ceased 
offshore drilling in the Lofoten Islands, located in the Arctic Ocean.  See Mikael 
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the Paris Agreement.204  Because it aims at curbing the effects of 
global warming, it reduces uncertainty for such key players.  Any 
uncertainty makes business decisions more complex, increasing the 
transaction costs for the parties.205  In an open letter to President 
Trump, more than thirty U.S. CEOs urged him to remain in the Paris 
Agreement.206  Modernization, competitiveness, and predictability 
are among the core justifications mentioned.207   U.S. withdrawal 
from the Agreement will likely increase the costs of doing business 
in the country, while removing economic opportunities that would 
have been generated if the administration took climate change 
seriously. 208   It may also signal that U.S. companies have lost 
government support and regulatory certainty.209 
C. The Domestic Benefits of the Withdrawal 
This Section delves into the supposed benefits of the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, focusing on presidential 
justifications. 210   The President believes the agreement 
“disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other 
countries” and contends U.S. taxpayers would have to absorb the 
costs of lower wages, lost jobs, closed factories, and a diminished 
economy.211  However, the data cited by President Trump212 is from 
 
 204 Paul Wiseman, Analysts: Leaving Climate Deal Likely Wouldn’t Add U.S. Jobs, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (June 1, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/f89a55b6fcd0428eab02a6f41b24776b/Analysts:-Leaving-
climate-deal-likely-wouldn't-add-US-jobs [https://perma.cc/U8BW-BAY3].  
 205 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 400-04. 
 206 CEOs of Major U.S. Companies Urge Trump: Stay in Paris, B TEAM (May 10, 
2017), https://bteam.org/our-thinking/news/30-major-ceos-call-on-trump-stay-
in-paris [https://perma.cc/X8KR-TBS5].  
 207 Id.  
 208  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 1311-34 
(arguing that the use of scientific information enabling people to prepare for climate 
change in advance can provide economic opportunities while proactively 
managing the risks, diminishing the negative effects and costs of climate change 
over time). 
 209 Kemp, supra note 4, at 459. 
 210 Trump, supra note 1.  The President says the United States “[w]ill withdraw 
from the Paris Climate Accord but begin negotiations to reenter either the Paris 
Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that are fair to the United 
States, its business, its workers, its people, its tax payers.” 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
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a discredited study.213  Yet as of February 2020, the administration’s 
position has not changed, and their arguments continue to revolve 
around economic reasons.214 
Economists quickly refuted President Trump’s arguments.  They 
contend rescinding the Paris Agreement will aggravate domestic 
problems because it would not lead to job creation.215  Yet despite 
the upcoming Paris withdrawal and the support of the Trump 
administration, coal-fired power plants are closing across the 
country.216  Jobs that might be preserved by the President’s decision, 
such as those in the coal and oil industries, will not be created in the 
renewable energy sector.217  Experts argue that the Paris Agreement 
does not cost net jobs, because jobs in clean energy industries attract 
more investment, creating a virtuous circle.218   Fostering a green 
 
 213 President Trump invoked a study by NERA Economic Consulting.  One of 
the primary flaws of the study is that only the costs of compliance with the Paris 
Agreement were factored in; benefits were disregarded.  See Greenberg, supra note 
85.  The Trump administration appears to make a habit of spreading 
misinformation.  When justifying their regulatory agenda, the administration cited 
a study estimating that excessive regulatory action would cost the U.S. economy $2 
trillion a year.  The article, however, was based on a flawed methodology and was 
never published by external sources—let alone peer-reviewed.  See Richard W. 
Parker, Hyping the Cost of Regulation, REG. REV. (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/06/25/parker-hyping-the-cost-of-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/F2MQ-GJ7J]. 
 214 In December 2018, during the Conference of Parties, an annual meeting of 
the parties of the UNFCCC, the U.S. stated its energy-related CO2 emissions had 
fallen by 14% since 2005, even as the U.S. economy grew by 19.4%.  Outcome of the 
24th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) to the U.N. Framework Convention 




 215  Wiseman, supra note 204.  For information on the general impact of 
environmental regulation, and evidence that environmental regulation does not 
reduce or increase overall jobs in the United States, see Cary Coglianese & 
Christopher Carrigan, The Jobs and Regulation Debate, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 
1, 1-5 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2014). 
 216  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL ENERGY & CO2 STATUS REPORT: COAL 5 
(2019). 
 217 Rolf Färe et al., Environmental Regulatory Rigidity and Employment in the 
Electric Power Sector, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 89, 89-108 (Cary Coglianese et 
al. eds., 2014).  
 218 As the EU and countries such as China and South Korea enact climate 
change policies, they foster investment in advanced energy, materials, electronics, 
including related technologies.  Over time, such advancements become 
commercially competitive, ultimately resulting in trade advantages for those 
countries.  See JANE A. LEGGETT & RICHARD K. LATINIZE, CONG. RES. SERV., IF10668, 
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economy and providing training and funding that allow workers to 
transition to new jobs is seen as a viable alternative.219 
Clean energy enabled the Obama administration to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1994 levels while creating 11.3 million 
jobs. 220   Meanwhile, the Trump administration cut 70% of 
investments in clean energy, 221  impeding job creation and 
jeopardizing U.S. competitiveness in the sector. 222   A frequent 
argument for U.S. reliance on coal is its cheap price, as the 
infrastructure is already in place.  There is no need to create wind 
farms, establish extra grids, offer additional training, or require 
further education. 223   However, constructing such infrastructure 
would create jobs.  Moreover, continuing to use coal produces 
significant externalities such as global warming,224 and increases the 
social cost of carbon, as it is the highest emitter of carbon dioxide.225  
Should the U.S. persist in choosing coal, the country will only hasten 
the day they will need to cope with the consequences of climate 
change. 
National leadership is needed to achieve a higher impact.  
Scholars and politicians argue that increased state and local action 
could help the United States achieve its NDCs. 226   In the U.S., 
 
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 5, 2019). 
 219 This argument builds on the social resilience analysis discussed by Sidney 
Shapiro and Robert Verchick.  See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert R.M. Verchick, 
Inequality, Social Resilience, and the Green Economy, 86 UMKC L. REV. 963, 984 (2018).  
 220 Gina McCarthy, If Trump Dumps the Paris Accord, China Will Rule the Energy 
Future, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 31, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/31/its-
time-for-the-united-states-to-lean-in-to-climate-change/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WHF-B4PA]. 
 221 Varun Sivaram & Sagatom Saha, Power Outrage: Cutting U.S. Government 
Funding for Energy Innovation Would Be a Grave Mistake, FOREIGN AFF. (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-05-17/power-
outage [https://perma.cc/4Y6Z-T3JP]. 
 222  This is in sharp contrast with China, which invests significantly in 
renewables and is leading the race for innovation.  See Peter Haas, Parxit, the United 
States, and the World, 15 CHINESE J. POPULATION, RESOURCES, & ENV’T 186, 188 (2017). 
 223 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 729-30 (presenting similar arguments in 
the context of renewable resources). 
 224 Id. 
 225 See infra Table 1 in Appendix I (showing the amount of carbon dioxide 
produced per type of fuel). 
 226  Cooper, supra note 5, at 441; see AMERICA’S PLEDGE,  
https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/CCM5-
27QB].  See also Bloomberg Philanthropies, Hundreds of Mayors, Governors, CEOs and 
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meaningful climate change action has been occurring at the state and 
local levels for some decades.227  This should continue after the U.S. 
withdrawal, as states, cities, and businesses join forces to meet the 
goals of the Paris Agreement. 228   These arrangements, however, 
cannot substitute for federal action.229  While on the one hand, the 
America’s Pledge arrangement comprises more than half of the U.S. 
economy—if it were a separate country, it would boast the third-
largest economy in the world 230 —on the other hand, it only 
encompasses 35% of total U.S. GHG emissions.231 
Local and state legal actions have their own limitations and 
require significant legal expertise to be effective.  The 2005 green 
building code enacted in Albuquerque, New Mexico was deemed to 
override federal law.232  Other similar ordinances were approved 
but required fine legal crafting to substantively differentiate the 
local scheme from national standards.233  Additional challenges arise 
based on the dormant commerce clause 234  or the argument that 
 
Others Pledge U.S. Commitment to Paris Climate Agreement, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 
6, 2017), https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2017/06/06/hundreds-of-mayors-
governors-ceos-and-others-pledge-u-s-commitment-to-paris-climate-agreement/ 
[https://perma.cc/VK2N-JBZT] (referencing Michael Bloomberg’s declaration to 
the U.N. Secretary General and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change).  America’s Pledge is an initiative to fight climate change which includes 
citizens, universities, businesses, cities, and states.  
 227 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 20 (2009) (“[T]he most significant efforts in the United States 
to address climate change have occurred at the state and local level.”).  
 228 See, e.g., Bloomberg Philanthropies, supra note 226.  
 229 See America’s Pledge: Phase 1 Report: States, Cities and Business in the United 
States are Stepping up on Climate Action, AMERICA’S PLEDGE 9, 9-10 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2017/11/AmericasPledgePhaseOneRep
ortWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6L-ZZV7] (acknowledging that subnational 
units cannot replace national policy on climate change). 
 230 Id. at 9. 




 232 See Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, The Legal Risks of Regulating Climate 
Change at the Subnational Level, REG. REV. (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/18/coglianese-starobin-legal-risks-
climate-change-subnational/ [https://perma.cc/CEY4-CXL6] (discussing the 
challenges that arise from regulating climate change at the state and local level).  
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
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climate policy falls under foreign affairs.235  Moreover, subnational 
entities should consider that carbon-intensive industry would 
simply transfer to less stringent jurisdictions nearby—so-called 
“leakage.”236  Such efforts may even lead to greater harm,237 such as 
the hardships that would occur if these jurisdictions have less 
developed safety nets for their own population. 
The reality is that the withdrawal “will neither bring back jobs 
nor help the taxpayers, but it will most certainly hurt the United 
States and the world.”238  A global problem such as climate change 
is best addressed through action at the highest governance level 
(national and global) because implementing a myriad of local 
policies is costly, complicated, and ultimately inefficient as they are 
limited to their geographical location.239  Subnational units are not 
well suited for regulatory action on national conduct leading to 
global externalities.240 
Having established the absence of benefits in the medium and 
long term in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, a note on the 
precautionary principle is needed.  This principle enunciates that 
action is required to avoid potential environmental threats in the 
absence of scientific certainty.241  This Article, thus, reconciles cost-
benefit analysis and the precautionary principle.  It assumes the 
precautionary principle is determinative in relation to which risks 
should be regulated, but not the stringency of regulation itself.242 
 
 235 Jean Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 2131, 2148-51 (2017) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. 
SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016)). 
 236 Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 232. 
 237 Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1964 (2007). 
 238 Robert N. Stavins, Why Trump Pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Accord and What 
the Consequences Will Be, FOREIGN AFF. (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-05/why-trump-pulled-us-out-
paris-accord [https://perma.cc/4R5Y-VV8H]. 
 239 Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 232.  
 240 Wiener, supra note 237, at 1962. 
 241 John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2002).  
 242 David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can 
they be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 791-812 (2013).  See also Farber, supra 
note 152, at 1721-24 (proposing different uses for the precautionary principle and 
cost-benefit analysis to avoid key economic uncertainties). 
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As such, the precautionary principle applies to climate change 
policy,243 because no definitive analysis can adequately capture the 
full costs of not taking regulatory measures to mitigate the risks.244  
In that vein, and considering that the United States is a party to the 
UNFCCC,245 the country remains obliged to reduce GHG emissions, 
the impact of which is notoriously difficult to reverse. 
Accordingly, the precautionary principle would at least oblige 
the United States to achieve its voluntary quota under the Paris 
Agreement.  Following this line of reasoning, countries should not 
move backward in climate change matters.  After all, in the case of 
climate policy, precaution is largely applicable to placing limitations 
on old technologies, such as fossil fuels.246  Furthermore, the world 
is beyond precaution now, as “we probably blew past our 
precautionary opportunity sometime in the 1980s.  We are now, and 
have been for some time, in a post-cautionary world.”247 
D. The Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal on the International Sphere 
This Section addresses the impact of the U.S. withdrawal on the 
international sphere and explains its consequences for the country 
as well as for climate change governance.  The U.S. State Department 
emphasizes that, despite the country’s withdrawal of the Paris 
Agreement, the U.S. will continue to work to reduce its emissions, 
adopting a balanced approach to climate policy and reconciling 
economic growth with energy security and lowered pollutants.248 
Economic growth and preserving the environment are not 
exclusionary goals, as the goals of the UNFCCC exemplify.249  The 
 
 243 See Kysar, supra note 156, at 558 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis and its 
limitations regarding the pursuit of efficiency in environmental contexts, 
specifically on moral foundations). 
 244 See Dana, supra note 198, at 70.  See also Kysar, supra note 156, at 566. 
 245 UNFCCC, supra note 17, art. 3(3); See Wiener, supra note 197, at 166-68 
(emphasizing the need for cost-effectiveness in the application of the precautionary 
principle). 
 246 See Wiener, supra note 197, at 170. 
 247 See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary 
Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (2008) (advocating for a post-cautionary principle and 
its policy implications). 
 248 Communication Regarding the Intent to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement, 
U.S. DEP’T ST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/communication-regarding-
intent-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement/[https://perma.cc/U7QD-FBPM].  
 249 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 4, 6. 
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Paris Agreement itself was designed to be exceedingly flexible 
regarding its goals and accommodating of new challenges. 250 
Experts differ about how much weight the U.S. withdrawal will 
carry.  Several can see the positives.251  However, the overwhelming 
majority contends that U.S. leadership is crucial to expand 
cooperation beyond the Paris Agreement.252 
Determining the international relevance of the U.S. withdrawal 
requires climate governance analysis.  The Paris Agreement 
established a new system of responsibilities for developed and 
developing countries,253 although it does not define which countries 
belong to each category.254   Developed countries should lead by 
meeting their absolute emission reduction targets, while developing 
countries should reduce their emissions in accordance with their 
unique national circumstances. 255   Governments in developing 
nations face increasing pressure to achieve economic prosperity, 
frequently at the expense of the environment.256  Nonetheless, the 
growth of renewable energy has helped displace the once dominant 
assumption that economic development and increasing GHG 
emissions must be tied.257  Moreover, such countries have greater 
incentives to reduce GHGs, due to the likelihood that developing 
 
 250 See David G. Victor, America Exits the Climate Stage, BROOKINGS INST. (June 
1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2017/06/01/america-exits-the-climate-stage/ [https://perma.cc/6PF4-
CJYM] (“Indeed, the United States, China, France, and others designed Paris so that 
it would be highly flexible—able to change in response to new realities, even the 
exit of the world’s most powerful nation.”). 
 251 See Kemp, supra note 4, at 460 (contending that a “rogue” United States 
would be worse than its leaving, due to the potential for imploding commitments 
from within).  This article, however, strongly disagrees, because this “rogue” 
United States would not be as publicly scrutinized as the U.S. withdrawal itself.  
More significantly, perhaps, is that at least the U.S. monetary commitments to the 
Green Climate Fund would be fulfilled. 
 252 See Victor, supra note 250. 
 253 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 4, 9, 10, 13. 
 254 See Ari & Sari, supra note 1, at 175. 
 255 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(4).  The treaty itself does not define 
those circumstances. 
 256  See Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environmental 
Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 272 (1993) (discussing 
conflicting policy choices). 
 257 See Brian Deese, Paris Isn’t Burning: Why the Climate Agreement Will Survive 
Trump, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-05-22/paris-isnt-burning 
[https://perma.cc/3U59-K6ME] (explaining how reductions in the price of 
renewable resources contributed to an increase in the “efficiency of energy 
consumption”). 
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nations will suffer more from harm related to climate change than 
those in the developed world.258  Developed countries have more 
resources, and are located primarily in the Northern Hemisphere, 
where temperatures are likely to be more temperate than in the 
Southern Hemisphere.259 
In his announcement, President Trump insisted that China and 
India would be allowed to build additional coal plants while the 
United States would not be permitted to increase its emissions.260 
This is not accurate, as all countries are obligated to establish a target 
and to report and evaluate their progress periodically.261  President 
Trump also mentioned that the Agreement intruded on U.S. 
sovereignty, as over time the targets will increase, while the United 
States needed to focus on “unlocking the restrictions on America’s 
abundant energy reserves.”262   The Paris Agreement, despite not 
imposing sanctions, encourages all countries to review their targets, 
under the assumption that countries will become more ambitious 
over time.263  As countries now see the benefits of adopting clean 
energy practices, they are more likely to increase their targets to 
enable them to profit more from this industry.264   However, the 
United States is unlikely to have such benefits as long as it remains 
committed to withdrawing from the Agreement.  Therefore, 
significant consequences of the United States withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement are the increase of the country’s GHG emissions 
and related pollution. 
Another adverse consequence of the withdrawal refers to global 
climate action.  According to the Paris Agreement, which promotes 
countries’ review of their targets under external monitoring, 
countries review their own targets and overall progress as well as 
those of other parties. 265   Civil society also scrutinizes their 
 
 258 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 135, at 232. 
 259 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 167, at 7 
(finding, with high confidence, that the impact of climate change varies in 
accordance with the geographical location and level of development, among other 
factors). 
 260 Trump, supra note 1. 
 261 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(2), 4(3), 4(9), 4(11). 
 262 Trump, supra note 1. 
 263 See Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3-7. 
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decisions.266  Although emissions targets for each country are quite 
different, “the inclusivity of the agreement motivates each country 
to scrutinize the performance of others.  When participation rates in 
social dilemmas are very high or very low, both stigma and honor 
are maximized for deviant behavior.”267  Such scrutiny is relevant, 
as the outcome is predicated on a global choice architecture system 
in which decisions are made by different actors such as consumers, 
large corporations, and governments; markets play a significant role 
in the system.268  The two primary issues that permit environmental 
harm to continue are the presence of incentives that are not properly 
aligned, and the absence of feedback on polluting activities.269  This 
external monitoring minimizes both challenges, mitigating market 
failures.270  Monitoring also generates negative publicity, which is 
an effective mechanism to decrease a lack of compliance with 
international treaties. 271   Because fear of earning a negative 
reputation is used to pressure countries to comply with 
international instruments, it is likely the United States will be subject 
to this negative repercussion.  The current President, however, 
seems indifferent to such effect. 
More significantly, perhaps, the President’s decision to 
withdraw ignores studies estimating that the United States stands to 
gain $2 trillion in direct benefits from global environmental action 
by 2030. 272   His view also disregards international law and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC), which refers specifically to different 
 
 266  Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6.  See also Jennifer Jacquet & Dale 
Jamieson, Soft but Significant Power in the Paris Agreement, 6 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 643, 644 (2016), 
https://jenniferjacquet.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/nclimate3006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9TL-M9H5] (detailing how civil society may help mobilize 
climate action fostering the goals of the Paris Agreement). 
 267 Jacquet & Jamieson, supra note 266, at 645. 
 268  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 187 (2009). 
 269 Id. 
 270 The introduction to this article discusses the necessity of environmental 
regulation due to market failure.  See also Stewart, supra note 25, at 172. 
 271 Samaan, supra note 256, at 274. 
 272 See Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Foreign Action, Domestic Windfall, INST. 
FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY 2 (2015) (describing the results from saving on non-incurred 
costs of pollution, including health and avoided environmental harms). 
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responsibilities allocated among countries.273  Under this principle, 
which still binds the United States because it remains party to the 
UNFCCC,274 responsibility for current and historical emissions need 
to be factored in. 275   The data is clear:  from 1800 to 2002, the 
developed world contributed more than 80% of GHG emissions.276 
As developing states have had a far lesser impact on the current 
concentration of GHGs and the overall threshold on carbon 
saturation,277 developed countries must provide climate financing to 
less developed countries in the terms determined in the Paris 
Agreement.278 
The United States has contributed the most carbon emissions in 
history, 279  yet committed to a rather small financial contribution 
under the Paris Agreement.280  The contribution of the parties of the 
Paris Agreement finances the Green Climate Fund, which was 
established by the Conference of the Parties in 2010 (under the 
UNFCCC and as part of the Conventions’ financial mechanism).281 
If the United States were to pay the amount it originally agreed to, 
 
 273 UNFCCC, supra note 17, art. 3(1) (“The Parties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis 
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities.”). 




 275 The principle itself is disputed, because even when costs and benefits are 
carefully calculated, and the policy choices and related values are explicit, different 
countries may reach different conclusions regarding the optimal level of emission 
reduction.  See, e.g., Esty & Moffa, supra note 27, at 779. 
 276  See DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 156 (2002) (stating the United States 
is the world leader in cumulative GHG global emissions, with approximately 30%). 
 277 See, e.g., Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2. 
 278 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.  See also Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, 
at 222 (discussing the cumulative impact of developing countries’ emissions). 
 279 Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2.  See also Table 2 in Appendix I (showing 
the top emitters of carbon dioxide). 
 280  See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9 (outlining the guidelines for 
financial contributions). 
 281  The Green Climate Fund technically aims to finance equal amounts to 
mitigation and adaptation initiatives under the UNFCCC.  Its initial mobilization 
started in 2014, and after the Paris Agreement (2015), it plays a key role in fostering 
the goals of such agreement.  Green Climate Fund, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/funds-and-financial-entities/green-climate-
fund [https://perma.cc/6SNK-24DH]. 
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it would be the eleventh highest financing country per capita.282 
However, because the United States suspended its financial 
contributions to the Green Climate Fund, 283  the country will 
ultimately pay less than $3 per capita.284  For the sake of comparison, 
the United Kingdom contributes $18.77 per capita, while Norway, 
the highest contributor, pays $50.56. 285   Hence, another major 
consequence of the United States withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement is the adverse impact on financing the Green Climate 
Fund, which promotes adaptation to climate change as well as the 
reduction of GHG emissions in the developing world.286 
Additional consequences of the withdrawal are plentiful.  In 
light of the changes pursued by the Trump administration, scientific 
data produced by U.S. researchers regarding climate change may no 
longer be available after the withdrawal, which is likely to have an 
adverse effect on global data sharing related to climate change.287 
Another potential negative effect of the U.S. withdrawal is that the 
Paris Agreement provides a mechanism for the development and 
transfer of technology.288  Furthermore, other countries rely heavily 
on U.S. leadership to reach more ambitious goals.289  U.S. leadership 
could push momentum towards curbing emissions (as done under 
the previous administration), instead of sponsoring a free-riding 
approach. 
International cooperation is dynamic and complex, subject to 
domestic, international, and supranational interests.  It is crucial that 
 
 282  See Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2 (explaining the original U.S. 
contribution would rank still behind the following nations, if per capita indexes 
were considered: Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Monaco, Britain, France, 
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan).  For complete data regarding the 
pledges of each country, its GDP, and its contribution per capita, see Table 2 in 
Appendix I.  
 283 Trump, supra note 1. 
 284  Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2.  See also Kemp, supra note 4, at 459 
(revealing that although the United States pledged to contribute $3 billion, it has 
paid only a third of that amount). 
 285 Additional data involving comparative analysis is available at Table 2 of 
Appendix 1. 
 286 The fund is attentive to the needs of those who are highly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change, specifically in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small 
Island Developing States (SIDs), and African States.  See Green Climate Fund, supra 
note 281. 
 287 If United States scientists do not share their data, global data on the subject 
will likely be far less comprehensive.  See Davenport & Landler, supra note 73. 
 288 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10. 
 289 Id. arts. 4, 9(3), 9(4). 
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actors are consistent in their international behavior.  Therefore, it is 
no surprise that former UN Chief Ban Ki-Moon claimed that the U.S. 
withdrawal would affect climate change and may have a significant 
impact on the prospects of the Paris Agreement.290  Experts contend 
that it may jeopardize global climate cooperation, specifically on 
NDCs.291  Considering the fragility of international cooperation, the 
U.S. withdrawal sets a terrible precedent.  Even if other countries, 
like Australia, merely entertain the possibility of withdrawal,292 that 
consideration might be blamed on the United States, as it will be the 
first (and, so far, only) country to actually withdraw.  Australia’s 
behavior provides evidence of a possible domino effect that the U.S. 
withdrawal could set in motion because Australia recently relaxed 
its emission targets.293   
Complicating this scenario is the déjà vu the U.S. withdrawal 
would bring to the international order, given its non-ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol.294  Legal scholarship suggests this decision led 
to changes in national leadership across the globe, inconsistent 
domestic policies, and exacerbation of mutual distrust among 
countries.295  Like when local entities take charge of environmental 
policies, the U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol increased 
the possibility that parties to the treaty would experience leakage, 
 
 290 Harini V, U.S. Withdrawal from Paris Agreement May Affect Climate Change: 
Former UN Chief Ban Ki-moon, CNBC (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/10/i-sincerely-hope-that-the-us-will-come-
back-says-ban-ki-moon.html [https://perma.cc/Z3A6-PRV7]. 
 291 See Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223. 
 292 Colin Packham & Erin Cooper, Australia Weakens Commitment to Climate 
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 294 In 2001, before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the United States 
Senate, believing the principle of differentiated responsibilities was not in the U.S. 
domestic interest, refused to ratify the treaty.  See Delali Benjamin K. Dovie & 
Shuaib Lwasa, Correlating Negotiation Hotspot Issues, Paris Climate Agreement and the 
International Climate Policy Regime, 77 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2017).  On that 
occasion, European governments opted to expand the Protocol.  The Kyoto Protocol 
was negotiated by the Clinton administration and, after the controversial election 
of President George W. Bush, environmental protection was no longer a priority. 
 295  See Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”—Struggling for Worldwide 
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 319, 328 (2008) (explaining how 
a “mutual distrust and threat of leakage hinder an adequate global response to 
climate change”). 
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seeing their businesses move to unregulated countries.296  Similar 
concerns have arisen in relation to the U.S. withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement, as local opposition to global action on climate 
change increased.297 
The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw is likely to 
contribute to anti-U.S. sentiment, as it creates the perception that the 
United States would be free-riding.  The country’s attempt at free-
riding jeopardizes U.S. leadership on a global level, 298  and the 
withdrawal could turn the U.S. into a climate pariah. 299   The 
withdrawal will enable the United States to emit more pollutants 
and reduce its mitigation costs.  After the withdrawal, the United 
States will begin  “squeezing other countries’ emission space and 
raising their mitigation costs.” 300   Game theory suggests this 
opportunistic behavior may lead to U.S. isolation, and perhaps even 
retaliatory actions by other parties to the Paris Agreement.301  In 
addition, it would be unsurprising if non-governmental actors 
consider boycotting U.S. products, due to the country’s blatant 
disregard for the environment. 
 
 296 Id. 
 297 Because of the U.S. withdrawal, the European Union, China, and Canada 
face increased domestic opposition, despite being committed to the Paris 
Agreement.  See Emre Peker, Around the World, Climate Goals Clash with Reality, 
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 298 See KOH, supra note 9, at 42 (arguing that despite presidential claims that 
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BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) countries to reinforce their 
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The absence of the United States as a global player leaves a 
leadership vacuum302  that provides an unprecedented opportunity 
for China and India to boost their international reputations and soft 
power.303  Commentators suggest the U.S. withdrawal is more than 
relinquishment of its leadership, as it ultimately enables China to 
become the leading player in the energy sector.304  Global warming 
itself may bring gains to Russia.305  A few countries wasted no time 
in taking action to mitigate the impact of the U.S. decision. 306  
Meanwhile, it is clear that U.S. leadership in international matters is 
eroding under President Trump due to sudden changes and the 
uncertainties they bring.307   Although this Article focuses on the 
Paris Agreement, the U.S. denunciation of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (or the “Iran deal”), 308  the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,309 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty310 
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despite its previous praise for the treaty, which was signed by President Reagan.  
For a limited justification of the withdrawal, see Donald J. Trump, Remarks by 
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all demonstrate that choices made by this administration occur with 
little notice, involve limited, if any, reasoning, and are considered 
contentious by the international community.  The choice to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement being similar, it will likely 
cause similar reactions across the world, further eroding US power. 
The lack of U.S. leadership has put more pressure on the United 
Nations, which has been actively pursuing environmental 
protection and seeking ways to reduce the impact of climate change.  
The UN Security Council recently recognized climate change as a 
“threat multiplier,” as climate-related risks and conflicts are already 
a reality for millions of people around the globe, threatening peace 
and security. 311  As part of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, the UN created the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which are meant to serve as an urgent call to action to 
citizens across the globe.312  Although all member states adopted the 
Agenda in 2015, and consequently are meant to uphold the SDGs, 
the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement conflicts with those 
stated goals. 
Despite global efforts and policies to mitigate climate change, it 
remains to be seen whether other countries will continue to comply 
with the Paris Agreement after the United States withdraws.  The 
withdrawal is perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the 
agreement and jeopardizing the effectiveness of climate change 
governance.313  It is possible that countries will elect to sign on to the 
Agreement or decide to make their voluntary compliance more 
effective.  India’s compliance with its NDCs, despite the upcoming 
U.S. withdrawal, provides evidence that other countries may follow 
 
President Trump Before Air Force One Departure (Oct. 20, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
air-force-one-departure-4/ [https://perma.cc/SM35-43NK].  
 311  See Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security Council 
Debates its Impact on Peace, UN NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 [https://perma.cc/URH4-
V6VL] (discussing desertification and food and energy security). 
 312 Of the seventeen principles, Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy) and Goal 
13 (climate action) are particularly relevant to the topic at hand.  They demonstrate 
the need for all countries—developed and developing nations alike—to commit to 
effective and responsible actions to protect the environment and curb global 
warming.  See Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS (2015), 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7VH-8HAT]. 
 313 Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 222. 
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this route.314  Meanwhile, Australia’s behavior, ultimately electing 
not to comply with its original NDCs, indicates other parties may 
refuse to be bound to their targets.315 
The latter scenario becomes much direr when considering that 
President Trump’s decision may mean the world misses its one 
window of opportunity regarding climate change mitigation, 316 
particularly as research shows the ten years after the Paris 
Agreement are crucial for achieving its targets. 317   Mitigation is 
vital, 318  because it is the only way to reduce carbon emissions 
effectively.319  A recent study by Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus 
concludes that limited global action on climate change means the 
reduction of 2°C is unattainable, and the need for policies to slow 
climate change is growing more pressing.320  The U.S. withdrawal 
not only hinders the country’s ability to maintain its leadership 
position in the global arena, but—more significantly—possibly 
hampers the possibility of taking meaningful global action on 
climate change.  Regardless, should the United States withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement, a race to the bottom will have begun, 
exposing all to the extreme consequences of global warming in a 
manner that certainly will not improve the overall well-being of 
either U.S. residents or those residing elsewhere on the planet. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article finds that the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement is not justified under the rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
 
 314 Annie Gowen & Simon Denyer, As U.S. Backs Away from Climate Pledges, 




 315 Packham & Cooper, supra note 292. 
 316 The urgency of climate change action was a significant factor addressed in 
the Paris Agreement, and there was international consensus about it.  See Morgan 
et al., supra note 36, at 9. 
 317 Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223. 
 318 WB, supra note 182, at 2. 
 319 SOVACOOL ET AL., supra note 144, at 184.  
 320 William Nordhaus, Projections and Uncertainties About Climate Change in an 
Era of Minimal Climate Policies, 10 AM. ECON. J. 333, 358 (2018), 
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20170046 
[https://perma.cc/DA8T-RCCK]. 
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test outlined therein.  First, the manner in which this decision was 
reached was evaluated, focusing on its procedural terms.  This 
assessment shows the current administration did not make a 
reasoned decision regarding the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, and illustrates how the withdrawal abruptly departs 
from previously reasoned regulatory action.  The absence of a 
scientific advisor, the lack of sound science, and lobbying efforts are 
considered factors indicative of unreasoned action.  The Article 
analyzes the existing litigation on the Paris Agreement, 
contextualizing its potential increase after the withdrawal.  Current 
trends involving such litigation, which are unveiled in this Article, 
provide evidence of such an increase.  The legal uncertainty 
provoked by the intended withdrawal indicates transaction costs for 
the involved parties are increasing and will likely continue to do so. 
Second, this Article assesses the costs and benefits of the policy 
decision itself, concentrating on the merits (substantive terms) of the 
withdrawal.  It addressed the pertinent challenges for this 
assessment and discussed the domestic costs and arguable benefits 
of the U.S. withdrawal.  This analysis finds that subnational units 
are unfit substitutes for national climate policy.  The Article shows 
how the withdrawal will create more costs than benefits for the 
United States in the medium and long term, while the limited short-
term benefits will be restricted to the coal-industry.  Moreover, these 
so-called “benefits” are unlikely to be actual gains, as the 
withdrawal disregarded the social cost of carbon and the divested 
investments on renewable energy.  The estimated strong impact of 
the withdrawal on the GDP demonstrates how it is detrimental to 
the U.S. economy.  This shows President Trump’s decision does not 
maximize overall well-being. 
Furthermore, this Article establishes that the U.S. withdrawal 
has and will continue to have an adverse global impact.  It lessens 
the country’s leadership role in the international arena, which will 
take several years to recover, and may prove detrimental to 
immediate trade considerations.  More significantly, the withdrawal 
may cost the United States, and the world, to miss out on a narrow 
window of opportunity to combat climate change.  Consequently, 
the United States and the rest of the international community are 
potentially more susceptible to the devastating consequences of 
climate change. 
Finally, as the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does 
not pass the cost-benefit analysis test, it demonstrates that the 
United States should remain in the Agreement and continue to be a 
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leading force in reducing carbon emissions and mitigating the 
effects of climate change.  The criticism regarding the withdrawal 
will continue alongside the desire for climate change being taken 
seriously.  Harshly dismissing climate change as a Chinese 
invention and announcing his intention to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement, as President Trump did, is unreasoned.  It does not 
maximize the overall well-being of U.S. residents, it adversely 
impacts global action on climate change, and ultimately fails the 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis conducted in this Article. 
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APPENDIX I: FIGURES 
























 321 This chart was developed by the author based on the carbon emissions of 
fossil combustiles during 2016.  See IEA Atlas of Energy, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2016), 
http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/1378539487 [https://perma.cc/G8NT-
4K48].  For per capita emissions, see Table 2. 
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TABLE 1: CARBON DIOXIDE PRODUCED PER TYPE OF FUEL322 
 
Fuel Type Pounds of CO2 emitted 
(per million BTU) 
Coal (anthracite) 228.6 
Coal (bituminous) 205.7 
Coal (lignite) 215.4 
Coal (subbituminous) 214.3 
Diesel fuel and heating oil  161.3 
Gasoline (without ethanol) 157.2 
Propane 139.0 
Natural Gas 117.0 
 
TABLE 2: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN FUND BY COUNTRY AND 
EMISSIONS PER CAPITA323 














Australia  187 7.92 62 17 
Austria 34.8 4.01 51 8 
Belgium 66.9 6.18 48 9 
Bulgaria 0.10 0.02 8 7 
Canada 277 7.79 50 14 
Chile 0.30 0.02 15 5 
Colombia 0.30 <0.01 8 2 
Cyprus 0.47 0.40 27 7 
Czech Republic 5.32 0.57 20 10 
Denmark 71.8 12.73 61 7 
Estonia 1.30 0.99 20 14 
Finland 107 19.40 50 10 
 
 322  Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced When 
Different Fuels Are Burned, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last reviewed June 4, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 [https://perma.cc/H798-
CVV8]. 
 323 Status of Pledges and Contributions Made to the Green Climate Fund, GREEN 
CLIMATE FUND (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.greenclimate.fund/how-we-
work/resource-mobilization [https://perma.cc/9UNR-LVQB].  
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France 1035 15.64 43 5 
Germany 1003 12.40 48 9 
Hungary 4.30 0.43 14 5 
Iceland 1.00 2.10 52 6 
Indonesia 0.30 <0.01 4 2 
Ireland 10.7 0.58 53 8 
Italy 317.5 4.54 35 7 
Japan 1,500 11.80 36 9 
Latvia 0.50 0.24 16 4 
Liechtenstein 0.10 1.48 135 1 
Lithuania 0.10 0.04 16 5 
Luxembourg 46.8 58.63 111 21 
Malta 0.60 0.70 23 6 
Mexico 10.0 0.08 10 4 
Monaco 2.30 28.89 163 – 
Mongolia 0.1 0.02 4 7 
Netherlands 133.8 7.94 52 10 
New Zealand 2.6 0.57 42 7 
Norway 272.2 50.56 97 9 
Panama 1.00 0.25 12 3 
Peru 6.00 0 7 2 
Poland 0.10 <0.01 14 8 
Portugal 2.70 0.26 22 5 
Rep. of Korea 100 1.99 28 12 
Romania 0.10 <0.01 10 4 
Spain 160.5 3.46 30 6 
Sweden 581.2 59.31 59 6 
Switzerland 100 12.21 85 5 
United 
Kingdom 
1,211 18.77 46 7 
United States 3000 9.41 55 17 
Vietnam 1.00 – 2 2 
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